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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to compare the presi
dential styles of the three leaders of France’s Fifth Repub
lic within the realm of foreign policy.
A framework of analysis was devised to compare the
performance of De Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard in office.
Each man is analyzed in terms of the experiences and condi
tions that molded his world view; the support and opposition
that he encountered in carrying out his programs; the goals
that he hoped to achieve and the image that he projected to
the world. This study deals as much with personalities as
with issues.
Only three issues are considered in depth:
the
Common Market (EEC), NATO, and East-West relations.
It is suggested that the institutional arrangement
of the Fifth Republic provides France’s president a. unique
opportunity to leave his personal imprint on French foreign
policy.
This comparison demonstrates that there are more
substantive differences among the three presidents than
might be apparent to the casual observer. The most obvious
differences are in style, especially when one compares de
Gaulle and Giscard.
Each president appears to have made a
conscious effort to distinguish himself from his predeces
sors in matters of style.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
A Study in Presidential Styles

INTRODUCTION
The three presidents of France's Fifth Republic
have displayed unique and sometimes divergent styles in the
conduct of foreign affairs.

From June 1958 through April

1969> Charles de Gaulle alone formulated French foreign
policy.^- His was a very personal style.

France's inter

national posture was an extension of the General's persona
lity and prejudices.

The foreign policies of Georges

Pompidou reflected the .the Gaullist heritage' with the notable
exception of Britain's admission to the Common Market in 1972*
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who became -the Fifth Republic's
first non-Gaullist president in May 197^ > has differed from
his predecessors in matters of style and of substance.
Under Giscard, France has become less vehemently anti-NATO
and less stridently anti-American.

The French leader has

demonstrated his ability to work amicably with London and
Washington.

Relations between France and its neighbors have

changed considerably since 1958.

The purpose of this study

is to examine the evolution of French foreign policy during
the past two decades and to compare the presidential styles
of de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard.
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The constitution of the Fifth Republic assigns
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs
to the executive.

Through a liberal interpretation of

Article Five, de Gaulle accorded himself virtual autonomy
in foreign relations.

Article Five defines the president

as "the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity
of the territory, and of respect for Community agreements
p
and treaties."
Article Twenty-one delegates responsibility
for national defense to the prime minister.

De Gaulle ignored

this separation of powers and established foreign policy and
national defense as his private domains.

The General believed

that the only solution to France's foreign policy problems was
a strong executive.

He articulated this conviction on June

16, 19^6, in his now-famous Bayeux speech.
It would be the duty of the Chief of State
to reconcile, in the choice of men, the
general interest with the orientation that
emerges from the Parliament; it would be
his mission to nominate the ministers and,
of course, firstly the premier who is to
direct the policy and the work of the
Government; it would be the function of
the Chief of State to promulgate the Laws
and to issue the decrees, for it is toward
the State as a whole that citizens are
obligated by them; he would have the task
of presiding over the cabinet meetings and
exercising there the influence of continuity
without with a nation cannot survive; he
would serve as arbiter above political con
tingencies, either normally through the
Council, or, in moments of grave confusion,
by inviting the country to make known its
sovereign decisions through elections; he
would have, if it were to happen that the
nation were in peril, the duty to safeguard
national independence and the treaties con
cluded by France.3

Between 19^6 and 1958, the twenty-three cabinets
k
of the Fourth Republic had grappled with overseas policy.
Crises in Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria had con
tributed to the demise of several governments and had helped
to topple successive cabinets.

In de Gaulle's view, lack of

consensus within the parliament was largely responsible for
France's poor record in foreign affairs.

He considered the

parliament a morass, characterized by numerous parties and
conflicting interests, and in itself a primary cause of France'
overseas predicament.

"In brief," he noted at Bayeux, "the

rivalry of parties is in our country a fundamental character
istic, always questioning everything and before which, too
often, the higher interests of the country are obscured."-^
When he received an electoral mandate as president
of the fledgling Fifth Republic in January 1959* de Gaulle
insisted upon taking foreign policy into his own hands.
Foreign policy was designed in the Elysee Palace and pre
sented to the National Assembly as an accomplished fact.
Critics have noted that the General was uncertain
how to resolve the Algerian crisis when he assumed office.
This criticism is substantiated by de Gaulle's erratic
behavior toward Algeria.

One author has described de Gaulle

as a master of the equivocal statement.^

When he announced

"I have understood you" to the demands of French Algerians
in the Forum of Algiers on June

1958, he was expressing

an appreciation of their situation rather than agreement with
their views.

The General vacillated between a military solu

tion in Algeria and the granting of total independence.

He
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came under pressure from such sources as the United Nations,
Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), Algerian-born
Frenchmen (pieds-noirs) , and his own generals.

Though his

solution did not placate all of these elements, metropolitan
France approved it in a popular referendum.

De Gaulle deserves

most of the credit for this achievement.
The General's solution to the Algerian problem
established a precedent in French foreign policy.

Not since

Pierre Mendes-France staked his reputation on an acceptable
conclusion to the Indochina conflict in July 195^ had a French
leader resolved an overseas crisis.

De Gaulle was to continue

this style in his treatment of the NATO alliance, and in his
relations with the United States, Great Britain, and French
Quebec.

His rallying cry of "Long live free Quebec!" during

a state visit to Canada on July 25> 1967V shocked his hosts.
His insistence on the development of an independent nuclear
strike force also frustrated his Western allies.

The French

leader was reluctant to depend on the American nuclear umbrella
in the event of a Soviet invasion of West Germany.

He did not

believe that the United States would commit its nuclear wea
pons against the Soviet Union and sought to develop an indep
endent French arsenal.

Since an effective deterrent is

designed to prevent a war rather than win one, Western analy
sts have questioned that deterrent value of the French nuclear
capability.

Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1969 that "deterrence--

the policy of preventing an action by

confronting the opponent

with risks he is unwilling to run--depends in the first

6
instance on psychological criteria.

What the potential aggre

ssor believes is more crucial than what is objectively true.
Deterrence occurs above all xn the minds of men.'

7

Never

theless, de Gaulle perservered, and to this day France steers
an independent nuclear course.
Sometimes de Gaulle's policies seemed contradictory.
He originally opposed decolonication in Algeria; four years
later he granted independence to Algeria.

Though he accepte

regional integration through such organizations as the Euro
pean Economic Community, he opposed Britain's entry to the
Common Market and refused to allow the French military to
participate actively in NATO.

Though he held open referenda

on his policies of Algerian self-determination and independence,
he summarily withdrew French forces from NATO in 1966 after
perfunctory consultations with only three cabinet members.
Despite these contradictions, he solved the colonial problem,
stabilized the government, aided modernization, and did much
to enhance his nation's status as a world power.
It was a standard joke within the legislature of
the Fourth Republic that parliament formulated foreign policy,
the executive approved it, and no one implemented it.
Gaulle proved this clich6 wrong.

De

In the Fifth Republic, the

president formulated, approved, and implemented foreign
policy.
De Gaulle believed that his authority derived from
his credentials and from his special relationship with the
French people.

On January 29» I960, he launched the following
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appeal:

"By virtue of the mandate that the people have

given me and of the national legitimacy that I have embodied
for twenty years, I ask all men and women to support me, no
o

matter what happens."

On January 6, 1961, he returned to

this theme in an address about Algerian independence.

"For

more than twenty years, events have willed that I serve as the
guide of the country during the grave crisis we have lived
through ... But also, I need--yes, I need— to know what is in
your hearts and minds.

That is why I am turning to you, by 

passing all intermediaries.

In truth--who is not aware of

it--the matter is between each woman and man of France and
myself.
In June 19^0, de Gaulle established a Free French
movement in London after the collapse of the Third Republic.
Throughout the war he considered himself and his group the
true government of France and denounced the Vichy regime as
a Nazi puppet.

Directives issued by his office during the

war often began, "We, Charles de Gaulle ..."

Even during his

absence from the political scene between 19^6 and 1958 he
believed himself the embodiment of "The Eternal France,"
which he describes so eloquently in the opening pages of
his War M e m o i r s . ^
Though not inclined to view themselves as the pro
duct of a great historical tradition, de Gaulle's successors
have reflected his belief in a powerful presidency.
de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou was a strong leader.

Like

After his

election in June 1969» Pompidou consolidated Gaullist strength.
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The vital areas of foreign policy and defense remained within
the jurisdiction of the president.

Pompidou announced policy

decisions without allowing debate either in the National Assem
bly or among his own ministers.

He advocated a powerful France

that would remain independent of NATO, the United States, and
the Soviet Union.

In a deviation from the Gaullist path,

Pompidou invited British Prime Minister Edward Heath to Paris
for talks which resulted in Britain's admission to the EEC.
Except for the issue of the Common Market, Pompidou's foreign
policy was quite similar to de Gaulle's.
If de Gaulle and Pompidou appear to have been cast
from the same political mold, such is not the case with Valery
Giscard d'Estaing.

As minister of finance under de Gaulle,

Giscard criticized the General's solitary exercise of power,
the authoritarian style of his regime, and his insufficient
commitment to European solidarity.

After his victory in the

presidential election of 1965 by a mere 5^ percent of the
second ballot, de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his govern
ment .

The General blamed his performance at the polls partly

on Giscard's conservative economic policies, and cited the
young man's "ambivalent attitude toward the government" as
reason for his dismissal.^
The platform of Giscard's Independent Republicans
was more liberal, less anti-American, and more European than
12
de Gaulle's.
Giscard considers himself a European as well
as a Frenchman.

He advocates an active French participation

in the EEC, and envisions France as an integral part of the
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European community rather than an isolated and priviledged
member.

He does not foresee the political unification of

Western Europe, however.

In nuclear policy, he still guards

the autonomy of France’s nuclear strike force.

Giscard does

not share de Gaulle's Anglophobia; in June 1976 he became
the first French president in sixteen years to visit
Britain. ^

He also enjoys a close personal relationship

with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Improved

relations among Paris, London, Bonn, and Washington have
prompted Giscard to reconsider France's NATO position.

lA

Pompidou reinstated Giscard as minister of finance
in 1969.

After the death of Pompidou in April 197^* Giscard

won a closely contested election victory from Socialist candi
date Francois Mitterrand by a margin of less than ^00,000
votes.He

faces an equally strong challenge from the same

quarter in the presidential election of 1981.
This comparison of the presidential styles of de
Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard draws heavily upon the precedent
of such American social scientists as James David Barber.

His

classic study of American presidential styles deals mainly
with the elements of personality that determine a man's per17
formance in office.
Barber attempts to fit presidents into
specifically defined categories, which serve as instruments
of analysis.

This study will address broader aspects of pre

sidential style, focusing upon the attitudes and actions of
three individual decision-makers within the context of de
Gaulle's Fifth Republic.
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More than in most countries, France’s institutional
framework permits its president virtual autonomy in the con
duct of foreign affairs.

The character of France's president,

therefore, largely determines the character of French foreign
policy.

France's activities abroad readily reflect the ideals,

values, motivations, perceptions, prejudices, and idiosyncracies of its chief executive.
This thesis will demonstrate the effect of individ
ual style on the exercise of French foreign policy during the
tenure of each of the three presidents.

It will (1) examine

the specific philosophies and experiences that influenced
each man's world view;

(2) analyze the conditions that affected

each president's foreign policies;

(3) study the support and

opposition that each encountered in attempting to achieve his
objectives;

(4) enumerate the results that each hoped to

achieve in the realm of foreign policy; and (5) explore the
effect of each man's style upon the international community.
In order to limit the scope of this study to manageable pro
portions, it will consider only three issues in depth:

France's

role in the European Economic Community, France's view of NATO
and its nuclear strike force, and France's relations with the
Eastern and Western blocs.
The topic will be treated according to the follow
ing plan.

Chapter One will examine de Gaulle and his concep

tion of France's role in the world.

Chapters Two and Three

will deal with the foreign policies of Pompidou and Giscard
respectively.

Chapter Four will offer a comparative analysis

of the three leaders.

CHAPTER I
De Gaulle
Charles de Gaulle was one of the most articulate
speakers and prolific writers of the modern era and expres
sed himself on a wide range of topics.

His first hook,

entitled Discord Among the Enemy, was published in 192^-.
De Gaulle’s biographer, Jean Lacouture, describes his first
work as "a very interesting little book, made up of five
studies denouncing, one after another, the encroachments of
military authority on the civil power in imperial Germany,
and finding in those encroachments the fundamental reason for
the collapse of the State at the end of 1918.

Charles de

Gaulle was to publish better books ... The ’primitive' among
f
the literary works of de Gaulle has a clarity of line, a sharp
ness of approach, which is often lacking in the majestic orna
mentation- -and even in the skillful omissions--of the later
essays.
De Gaulle wrote Discard Among the Enemy while a
prisoner of war in Ingolstadt, Germany.

Seriously wounded

on three separate occasions, he was taken prisoner after a
close action at Douaumont on March 2, 1916.

As a second

lieutenant of the Thirty-third Infantry Regiment he wrote,
"It appeard in the wink of an eye that all the virtue in the

11
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world could not prevail against superior firepower."

2

Nicknamed "the Constable" by his fellow prisoners, he spent
the next thirty-two months in five different internment camps.
De Gaulle published his second work, entitled The
Edge of the Sword, in 1932.

Throughout the book he tried

to reconcile the roles of the statesman and the soldier.

In

his foreword he appeared to favor the soldier.
Force has watched over civilizations in
the cradle; force has ruled empires, and
dug the grave of decadence; force gives
laws to the peopls and controls their
destinies.
It is true to say that the
fighting spirit, the art of war, the
virtues of the soldier, are an integral
part of man's inheritance. They have
been part and parcel of history in all
its phases, the medium through whi-ch it
has expressed itself.^
It was difficult for de Gaulle to reconcile the man of force
and action (soldier) with the man of tact and letters (states
man) without sacrificing one to the other.

He seemed per

plexed by this dichotomy in his own personality.

In the

closing chapter of The Edge of the Sword he concluded that
the two roles were mutually supportive.

"There is no soldier

who, by winning fame for himself, has not served the hopes
and aims of high policy, nor any statesman who, by the great
ness of his achievements, has not won still a greater glory
l\.
-by contributing to the defense of his country."
De Gaulle published The Army of the Future while
still a captain in the army and an instructor at the military
college at St. Cyr.

Released in 193^> this work stressed the

need for a career army quite unlike the conscription-based
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popular armies of the Napoleonic era and the First World War.
He advocated the formation of mechanized divisions that could
travel a hundred miles a day and attack the enemy from the
rear with close air support.

The French military establish

ment ignored his advice, placing its faith in the fixed forti
fications of the Maginot Line.

The German phenomenon of

blitzkrieg (lightning warfare) adopted the very system that
de Gaulle had suggested five years before.

German tanks

assisted by Stuka dive bombers swept across France in May
19^0 in a six-week campaign that stunned the world.

De

Gaulle's work also predicted that the Germans would attack
through the Ardennes, which according to conventional wisdom
was unsuitable terrain for mechanized operations.
tion proved painfully accurate.

His predic

The General later claimed in

his War Memoirs that Hitler's staff had read The Army of the
Future aloud to him in 193^Though the work was not well received by French
military planners, it was recognized for its quality outside
of France.

In the foreword to an English translation of the

book published in 19^1, editor Walter M.illis offered the
following appraisal of de Gaulle.
But this book of Captain de Gaulle has a
much greater importance today than that
merely of a prediction from which others
were to profit, of a neglected warning
for which events were to provide a ter
rible justification.
The obscure captain
of 193^ is now the Leader of Free France,
the man who snatched hope, energy, and res
olution out of the vast wreck, who raised
the banner while others were letting it
fall and who may yet play a large role in

14
the fate of his country and the world.
The book brilliantly etches the quality
of mind which he brings to the task. His
record sufficiently demonstrates his
capacities as a man of action:
the book
shows that he combines with them intel
lectual powers to which we are, perhaps,
too little accustomed in our own military
men. Here are that precision and lucidity
of thought, that ability to grasp the pro
blem of modern warfare as a whole, backed
by a real sense of the past, a real know
ledge of military history and even a
genuine literary grace, which are the ^
glory of the French military tradition.
This glowing review, though biased, indicates that others
sensed in de Gaulle the qualities of soldier and statesman
at this early stage in his career.
De Gaulle published France and Its Army in 1938*
In the course of 277 pages, he traced the history of the
French army through various stages of development, specifically
during the ancien regime, the revolution, the Napoleonic wars,
the Franco-Prussian war, and World War I.
work in his War Memoirs, he stated:

Describing this

"... in it I showed how,

from century to century, the soul and fate of the country were
constantly reflected in the mirror of its army; the final warn
ing which, from my modest place, I addressed to my country on
the eve of the cataclysm."
The General began writing his War Memoirs during
the 1950's.

The three volumes were subtitled The Call to

Honor 1940-1942, Unity 1942-1944, and Salvation 1944-1946.
The first volume was published in 195^; 'the two subsequent
tomes appeared in 1956 and 1959 respectively.

The combined

work is a substantial volume of some 1,000 pages that describes
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de Gaulle's political, military, and symbolic roles in six
years of French history.

The War Memoirs recount and justify

his participation in the battle of France, the establishment
of Free France, the campaign in Africa, the invasion of Nor
mandy, the liberation, the provisional government, and the
birth of the Fourth Republic.
After his defeat in the referendum of April 27,
1969, de Gaulle retired from public life to finish his memoirs.
He intended to publish a second trilogy, entitled Memoirs of
H o p e , to record the period 1958-1969.

The series was to con

sist of the following volumes:

Renewal 1958-1962, Effort

1962-1965, and Term 1966-1969.

The author lived to finish

the first volume and two chapters of the second.

The series

ends, therefore, with the spring of 1963.
There exists a wealth of primary sources about de
Gaulle.

All his speeches have been preserved, including his

BBC address of June 18, 1940, his Bayeux speech of June 16,
1946, and numerous statements and press releases from the
Fifth Republic.
survived.

Some of de Gaulle's conversations also have

His associate Andr<£ Malraux published a book

entitled Felled Oaks:

Conversations with de Gaulle in 1972.

7

De Gaulle's Concent of his Role in History
There is a perennial argument among scholars over
whether history brings forth men of destiny or men of destiny
make history. Certain individuals when confronted with criti
cal situations prove to be great leaders:
and Churchill fit this mold.
entire eras:

Lincoln, Roosevelt,

Other men are associated with

Alexander the Great, Julius Ceasar, and Louis XIV

16
are examples.

There is a third category which encompasses

both of the preceding types:

this is the man with resources

of mind and character, who is both a product and a symbol of
his times.

Charles de Gaulle was such a man.

He possessed

a flair for the dramatic that impelled him to participate in
the affairs of the world.

After serving an apprenticeship

that lasted half a century, he was equipped to attempt to
shape history to his own ends.
He was imbued with a sense of mission.

In the first

page of his War Memoirs, he stated that the notionns of histo
rical France and greatness was inseparable.

He served his

apprenticeship as an army officer, resistance leader, head
of the, provisional government, and political figure.

In 1958*

at the age of 6 7 , he was called upon to extricate France from
political, military, and economic chaos.

During the first

decade of the Fifth Republic, he set out to restore France's
greatness.
In The Edge of the Sword (1932) de Gaulle describes
the process by which certain men become in history.
desire to serve leads to train for the future.

Their

They must

possess a certain flair, intelligence, and eagerness to parti
cipate that encourage the development of ability and strength
of character.

According to de Gaulle, nothing great will ever

be achieved without great men, and men are only great if they
are determined to be so.

As examples, he cites the British

Prime Minister Disraeli and the French Marshal Foch.

The

author maintains that Disraeli taught himself to think like
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a prime minister in his youth, and that Foch demonstrated his
potential as a commander-in-chief while he was an obscure
g
instructor.
De Gaulle wrote these words while he himself
was an obscure instructor.
The author then describes the second phase, in which
the trained man influences the course of events.
this required a certain inspiration.

For de Gaulle

He notes that amtitious

young men, especially those of high rank, should exhibit en
thusiasm if not an obsession for leaving their mark on events.
In his stilted prose, he asserts that "from the shore on which
they live their uneventful lives, they should direct their
eyes to the stormy seas of History!

9

De Gaulle's prescription for greatness also entailed
a willingness to accept isolation.

In The Edge of the Sword,

his description of the leader foreshadowed the imperious per
sonality that would emerge as "The General."

He wrote that

"the man of character ... is inevitably aloof, for there can
be no authority without prestige, nor prestige unless he
keeps his distance."^0

This aspect of de Gaulle's character

prompted biographer Jean Lacouture to describe him as "Charles
the Alone.

De Gaule was ever conscious of his role in

world history.

The following summary seeks to examine this

role.
Historical Summary
French foreign policy after World War II was con
cerned primarily with three issues:

decolonization, the

political and economic reconstruction of Europe, and the
re-establishment of France as a world power.

The surrender

of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu in 195^ sounded the
death knell for French hegemony in Southeast Asia.
and Tunisia were granted independence in 1956.

Morocco

The war in

Algeria, which erupted on November 1, 195^» seemed to defy
solution.

Germany's entry into NATO was approved in 195^»

and France joined the EEC in 1957*

Though the Franco-Soviet

Pact of 1 9 ^ had solidified relations between Paris and
Moscow, France continued to pursue a policy of non-alignment
with either the Soviet bloc or the Western alliance.

France's

NATO commitment was its only contribution to the collective
security of Western Europe.
By 1958 France's involvement in Algeria had deepened
and the possibility of civil war in France further aggravated
the situation.

French generals in Algiers were fomenting

open rebellion, which accentuated the need for a strong leader
On May 13, 1958» extremists in Algiers forced the government
to a showdown, and Premier Pierre Pflimlin and President Rene
Coty turned to General de Gaulle.

The National Assembly

approved de Gaulle as premier on June 1, 1958, by a vote of
329 to
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The General then dissolved parliament, and a

majority of the electoral college subsequently confirmed his
appointment as chief executive.
A new constitution, which accorded the president
sweeping powers, went into effect on October 4 after being
ratified by the French electorate.

Article Five of the con

stitution grants the president internal and external powers.
Article Eight specifies that the president appoints the prime

minister and "on proposal of the premier, he appoints other
members of the government."

The president's military powers

are defined in Article Fifteen.
the armies.

"The president is chief of

He presides over the high councils and commit

tees of national defense."

Article Fifty-two prescribes that

"the president of the republic negotiates and ratifies treat
ies."

Thus, in the Fifth Republic, the president is chief

of state, responsible for all cabinet appointments, commander
in chief of the armed forces, and chief diplomatic negotiator
One analyst has noted that "the constitution evolved through
out the Gaullist period--and ... during Pompidou's presidency
in the direction of presidential.dominance." 13
^
The constitution also provides for specific emer
gency powers. Article Sixteen allows the president to invoke
these powers in time of crisis after "consultation with the
premier, the presidents of the assemblies, and the constitu
tional council."

Though required by law to consult with

government leaders, the president is not bound by their advic
He may therefore become the sole decision-maker by invoking
the emergency powers.

De Gaulle exercised this prerogative

only once, from April 23 until September 29, 1961, in respons
to the Generals' Revolt in Algeria.

On April 22, 1961,

Generals Challe, Salan, Zeller, and Jouhaud mutinied, threat
ening to drop paratroopers at Orly and overthrow the government. 1A

The General invoked the emergency powers for a five-

month period in order to subvert the efforts of the Organiza
tion of the Secret Army (OAS), which sought to depose him.
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There were several unsuccessful attempts on de Gaulle's
life during this period.
Article Thirty-eight grants the president the power
"to issue ordinances, for a limited period, concerning mat
ters that are normally in the domain of laws."

The general

issued several such executive decrees during the summer of

1961 .
Article Eleven allows the president to "submit to
referendum any government bill ... which, without being con
trary to the constitution, would have implications for the
functioning of institutions,"
times.

De Gaulle used this power five

Just over 53 percent of the French people voted

against this final measure.

Having staked his tenure in

office on support for this issue, de Gaulle resigned from
the presidency immediately.
The three powers— to declare a state of emergency,
to issue decrees that have the force of law, and to call for
referenda--give the president near dictatorial authority.
Inherent in these articles was de Gaulle's desire to bypass
the National Assembly, to invoke executive priviledge, and
to appeal directly to the people.

These provisions reflected

de Gaulle's basic distrust of deputies and the legislature
and his wish to reserve ultimate power for the executive.
Louis XIV's famous dictum "I am the state" found
its twentieth-century counterpart in the words of Charles de
Gaulle.

Speaking to General Salan, supreme commander of the

French forces in Algeria in 1958, de Gaulle is reported to
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TABLE 1
ISSUES DECIDED BY REFERENDUM UNDER DE GAULLE
Date

Issue

Result

September 28, 1958

Approval of the 1958
Constitution

Yes

January 8, 196l

Self-determination for
Algeria

Yes

April 8, 1962

Algerian independence as
specified in the Evian
Accords

Yes

October 28, 1962

Amendment of the constitu
tion to provide for direct
popular election of the
president

Yes

April 27, 1969

Reorganization of the
Senate and the establish
ment of regional councils

No
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have remarked, "I am the minister of Algeria."1-^

In his

War Memoirs de Gaulle repeatedly asserted that he was the
personification of France during the Nazi occupation.

In a

radio "broadcast on June 18, 19^+0 from the. BBC in London, the
General exhorted his fellow countrymen neither to assume the
mantle of defeat nor to abandon the struggle.
But has the last word been said? Must we
abandon all hope? Is our defeat final and
irremediable? To these questions I answer-N0!
Speaking in full knowledge of the facts, I
ask you to believe me when I say that the
cause of France is not lost.
The very
factors that brought about our defeat may
one day lead us to victory.16
These words prompted thousands of Frenchmen to
cross the English Channel and join de Gaulle’s Free French
movement or to join the resistance in France.

As leader of

the organized effort the General symbolized Free France during
the four years of occupation.

It was to this man, who was the

embodiment of tradition, that the Fourth Republic turned in
1958.

It comes as no surprise that de Gaulle assumed a great

deal of power after being elected president of the Fifth
Republic.
De Gaulle's program for dealing with Algeria con
sisted of four parts:

(l) France embarked upon a major pro

gram of economic development, which Included a $200 million
annual investment in the production of Sahara oil;

(2) counter-

insurgency efforts were expanded, as conscripts and special
guerrilla units arrived from the mainland;

(3 ) social changes

more all-encompassing than those proposed by Guy Mollet's
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Republican Front in 1956, including the enfranchisement of
women, were implemented; and (^) a sustained effort was made
to enlist international support for the French cause, and to
keep the United Nations out of the conflict.

17
(

When his program failed to satisfy the FLN, de
Gaulle began to consider the alternatives.

These included a

sovereignty-association arrangement, very similar to that
which the Quebec separatists have proposed to the Canadian
government, which would maintain economic ties but sever
1R
existing political bonds.
Two other distinct possibilities
were outright secession and self-determination.

De Gaulle

decided that French prestige would benefit by granting selfdetermination
secession.

and would suffer by contesting the right of

He therefore proposed Algerian independence in

the spring of 1962.

The Evian Accords were signed on February

21, 1962, implemented on March 19, 1962, and ratified by popu
lar referendum in metropolitan France on April 8 , 1962. ^
The Algerian conflict was one of the bloodiest in
French history.

It is estimated that as many as one million

Muslims died in the fighting, and French casualities are esti
mated at 27,000 killed and 65,000 wounded.

After the war,

the French officer corps returned to France along with some
^00,000 draftees and approximately one million French citizens
of Algeria.
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For the first time m

more than twenty years,

French soldiers were not dying overseas.
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Although de Gaulle focused his attention on Algeria
between 1958 and 1962, he also concentrated on France's EastWest relations.

One scholar has identified three distinct

periods of interaction between France and the superpowers
under de Gaulle:

1958-62, 1963-68, and 1968-6 9 . ^

Between

1958 and 1962, American dominance of the Atlantic alliance
frustrated de Gaulle.

He tended to favor the Soviet Union

in his relations with the superpowers, particularly as the
strategic balance shifted toward the United States after the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

The period 1963 to

1968 is noteworthy for France's independence of both blocs,
but especially of the West.
change.

Three incidents illustrate this

On January 4, 1963» de Gaulle rejected Kennedy's

proposal for a multilateral nuclear force consisting of the
United States, Britain and France.

He also vetoed Britain's

bid to enter the European Economic Community (EEC) on Januar
14, 1963*

His most dramatic gesture was France's withdrawal

from NATO in 1966.

The final period, 1968 and 1969, saw

France gravitate toward the West once again.

One analyst

has noted that de Gaulle's "opening to the east" ended
abruptly when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in
1 9 6 8 .2 2

Perhaps the most perplexing of de Gaulle's foreign
policy decisions was his withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance.
On March 10-11, 1966, he sent a memorandum to the NATO allies
announcing his intention to expel foreign troops from French
soil, to dismantle certain installations and military bases
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belonging to foreign powers, and to disengage the French
military from active participation in the alliance.

He had

previously refused to allow NATO to stockpile nuclear wea
pons in France, had prevented the emplacement of intermediaterange ballistic missile silos on French soil, and had forced
tactical wings of NATO fighter-bombers to find bases in
Germany rather than in France.

The French fleet had disen

gaged from NATO maneuvers as early as June 21, 1963.

In

retrospect, Professor Edward Kolodziej considers de Gaulle's
announcement of March 1 0 , 1966 more a natural culmination of
23
events than a departure from past policy. ^

Jean Lacouture

agrees.
The assault on NATO began in February 1966.
Nothing could have been more foreseeable.
In many respects it was a gesture that
gave expression to all of the deepest
impulses and prejudices on which his
diplomacy is based?
cynicism and
ruthlessness in the relations between
states (even so-called friendly states);
supremacy of national sovereignty over
any ideological concept of alliance;
France's standing among nations.
But
however typical it was of Gaullist
diplomacy, the gesture--being so tough,
so abrupt, so challenging--succeeded in
taking everyone by s u r p r i s e . 24
As a final gesture the General even restricted the number of
NATO flights allowed in French air space.

His policy toward

the Atlantic alliance aimed to decrease French participation
in regional security arrangements and to further France's
independence.
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French nuclear policy, which is based upon de
Gaulle's nuclear strike force, illustrates his notion of
independence.

On September 17> 1958, de Gaulle addressed

a memorandum to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Mac
Millan, and NATO Secretary General Henry Spaak stating that
it was not the intention of France to limit its foreign policy
within "the confines of N A T O . " ^

He proposed the establish

ment of a London-Paris-Washington "directorate" to replace
American leadership of the organization.

Each of the three

powers would be able to veto the decisions of the others;
unanimity was thus required.

Each power would assume respon

sibility for a specific sphere of influence in the Western
world.

Paris, naturally, claimed North Africa.

The directo

rate would formulate a joint military and political strategy,
create allied commands around the globe, and conduct strategy
deliberations on the employment of nuclear weapons.
Eisenhower rejected the proposal outright, prompting
an incensed de Gaulle to announce that France had no choice
but to steer an independent course.

France exploded its first

atomic bomb in the Sahara desert on February 13» I960.

26

De Gaulle then ambitiously embarked upon the construction of
sixty-two Mirage IY bombers, each of which was designed to
carry a sixty-kiloton weapon with three times the destructive
power of the bobm dropped on Hiroshima.
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By 1968 France had

build thirty-six of the bombers, which together carried wea
pons with the destructive equivalent of one Minuteman II
intercontinental ballistic missile.

One disadvantage of the

Mirage IV bomber was that in order to strike the Soviet Union
it had to refuel in mid-flight somewhere over Poland.

One

critic has noted that de Gaulle underestimated the technical
problems involved in developing the nuclear strike force,
while overestimating France's ability to finance it.
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Subsequent generations of French nuclear weaponry
have included a surface-to-surface missile capable of deliv
ering a 2^0-kiloton warhead at a range of 1,800 to 2,000 miles
These missiles are located in concrete silos in the Albian
plateau of Haute Provence in southern France.

France also

introduced two nuclear submarines to its fleet in 1972.
These submarines together carried thirty-two missiles with a
29
capacity of 500 kilotons each and a range of 2,000 miles.
(Note:

a one kiloton weapon has the destructive power of

1,000 tons of dynamite; thermonuclear weapons have the added
destructive force of blast, which is the heat released in
nuclear fission.)
Observers have cited various reasons for de
Gaulle's apparent obsession with an independent nuclear
strike force.

Perhaps he intended to boost the morale of

the army afterthe losses in Indochina and Algeria, or to
restore public confidence in the nation's ability to defend
itself,

De Gaulle believed that nuclear weaponry was the

great equalizer among nation-states; the nuclear strike force
satisfied his notion of grandeur.

Also, because he never

believed that the Americans would use nuclear weapons except
in defense of their own territory, the nuclear strike force
satisfied his desire for security and a credible French
deterrent.^

De Gaulle refused to sign any accord designed to
prevent the dissemination and development of nuclear weapons.
On August 5, 1963* more than one hundred nations signed the
nuclear test ban treaty, which was sponsored by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

The treaty

called for a moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere,
in outer space, and underwater.
underground testing, however.

It placed no restrictions on
Neither Communist China nor

France participated in the agreement.

De Gaulle believed

that by acquiescing to the demands of his allies he would
relegate France to the status of a second-rate power. 31
De Gaulle's dream of a strong Europe that woud com
pensate for the superpowers led him to propose a loose poli
tical alliance within the Common Market.

Christian Fouchet,

the French ambassador to Denmark, presented the plan to a
meeting of "The Six" in July 1961.

Another de Gaulle trial

balloon, the Fouchet plan consisted of the following proposals
political union of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Netherlands, and West Germany; formation of a joint council
of foreign ministers; cooperation in cultural, educational,
and scientific matters; and a legal union of European peoples.
"The Six" debated the proposals individually and approved
parts of them; they rejected the plan as a whole, however.
France's trading partners found the idea of a council of
foreign ministers particularly objectionable.

None of the

delegates favored the prospect of answering to de Gaulle in
matters of foreign policy.

The French president attempted to

29
coat the hitter pill with attractive concessions in the form
of cultural, educational, and scientific cooperation, but
his vision of a European bloc united before the superpowers
never materialized.
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De Gaulle could be just as contentious as his Com
mon Market partners, especially in the matter of Britain's
application for membership in the EEC.

There were two main

reasons for France's reluctance to admit the British to the
community:

Britain seemed unwilling to relinquish its

special relationship with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,
and it was particularly sensitive to the higher prices that
prevailed in the European market as compared to the world
market.

In de Gaulle's view, Britain wanted to have its

cake and eat it too.

Why should he allow the British to

expand their market by 300 million people, unless they were
willing to sacrifice their lucrative economic ties with the
Commonwealth countries and accept European market prices
without complaint?

There was no reason for admitting Britain

because, in de Gaulle's view, the British were no more Euro
pean than the Americans.

The General vetoed Britain's bid

for entry on January 14, 1963. ^

That evening he defended

his action with the following statement.

"It is quite pos

sible that one day England will be metamorphosed sufficiently
to join the European community without restrictions or reser
vations ... It is also possible that England will not change,
and the feeling that this is what will happen seems to be the
outcome of the very lengthly conversations in Brussels."
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The Dutch and some other members of the EEC had
favored British membership all along. J

Prospects for the

British case improved during the mid-sixties,

especially

after Britain distanced itself from American policies in the
Dominican Republic and Vietnam.

On May 11, 19&7» Britain

re-submitted its proposal to join the EEC.

Again de Gaulle

shelved the idea, which was not reconsidered until December
1969 under Pompidou. ^
It is a fallacy to assume that de Gaulle opposed
oo
European integration.
Typically, though, he wanted it on
his own terms or not at all.

De Gaulle's vision differed

from the European model of Jean Monnet, for example, in its
essentials.

De Gaulle favored a loosely-knit union of

nation-states with converging interests, whereas Monnet pre
ferred cooperation on an institutional level. ^

De Gaulle

based his entire world view upon the primacy of the nation
state; Monnet considered the nation-state obsolete and unable
to cope with complex international issues.

AO

De Gaulle

jealously guarded French sovereignty against encroachment by
any regional organization, but Monnet believed that European
integration only could be achieved through such organizations
such as the European Economic Community, the European Coal
and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, and
Ai
. .
Euratom.
Finally, de Gaulle sought to use a unified
Europe to enhance French prestige:

by allying with the Third

World, Europe could offset the influence of the superpowers.
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This was not what Jean Monnet had m

mind.

Lo

De Gaulle had

a confederal notion of European unity based on the nation
state; Monnet had a federal notion based on a European
Ll'i
.
.
Parliament. ^ The two points of view were irreconcilable.
In an appraisal of de Gaulle's presidency, one
critic has characterized him as preoccupied with foreign
affairs to the virtual exclusion of domestic issues.
In other countries, and especially in
Britain and the. United States, public
opinion has so identified France with
de Gaulle and his foreign policies
that the rest of the complex French
scene has tended to pass unnoticed.
But de Gaulle is not typical of
modern France.
He has not been greatly
interested in domestic affairs and has
had little direct influence on them
between 1958 a'nd 1968 save to provide
continuity of government.
Only in
rare moments of crises, like that
which forced itself upon him in May
1968, will he descend from the heights
to pay much attention to the desires of
the mass French p u b l i c . ^
It is useful to 'examine the domestic situation in France
during de Gaulle's presidency in order to understand the
reasons for his departure.
During his first four years in office de Gaulle
enjoyed a period of relative popularity that reached its
zenith in April 1962, when 90 percent of the French electorate
approved his decision to grant Algerian independence.

The

General encountered his first major opposition on October 5>
1962, when the Chamber of Deputies gave his premier a vote
of no confidence over the issue of direct popular election
of the president.

De Gaulle dissolved parliament and called
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for new legislative elections to take place as soon as a
referendum had resolved the dispute.

The voters approved

de Gaulle's proposal .hy an overwhelming 62.25 percent of
the vote on October 28, 1 9 6 2 . ^

In the subsequent legisla

tive elections, the Gaullists returned 228 deputies to the
National Assembly.

The vote of no confidence actually

resulted in an increase in Gaullist strength in parliament.
Once again de Gaulle had employed the instrument of the
popular referendum to his advantage.
The General did not fare as well in the presidential
elections of December 1965*

There was an unusually high turn

out (84.75 percent of all registered voters) for the first
ballot, of which de Gaulle won 44.64 percent with 10,828,523
votes.

The Socialist Francois Mitterrand received 31*72 per

cent with 7>694,003 votes.

Jean Lecanuet, the candidate of

the center, received 15*57 percent of the vote and three different candidates split the remaining ten percent.
returns troubled de Gaulle.
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The

During the two weeks between

the first ballot and the run-off election, Premier Pompidou
orchestrated an impressive campaign to woo marginal supporters
back into the Gaullist camp.

The effort proved successful.

Voter turnout was high on December 19 as well, with 84.33
percent of registered voters participating.

De Gaulle won

55.19 percent of the second ballot, with 13,083,699 votes.
Mitterrand ran a distant second, with 36.74 percent or
10,619,735 v o t e s . ^
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After 1965 de Gaulle's domestic base deteriorated
rapidly.

The nation experienced labor strikes, union unrest,

unemployment, and inflation.

In the legislative elections

of 1967 the Gaullists lost their parliamentary majority for
the first time and depended on the support of Giscard d*
Estaing's Independent Republicans.

A8

The final breakdown

occurred during the student riots of May 1968.

De Gaulle

left Paris at the height of the demonstrations for a state
visit to Rumania, leaving Premier Pompidou to handle the
rapidly escalating crisis.

The General was furious when he'

returned to find the Sorbonne occupied by student militants,
barricades in the streets, and the situation worsening by
the minute.

De Gaulle blamed most of this on Pompidou.

On May 2k, 1968, the General appeared on national
television to appeal directly to the people for support.

The

78-year-old president, obviously shaken and weary, did not
project the commanding presence of June 18, 19^0.

His old

charm appeared to have failed him.
Giscard and his Independent Republicans openly
opposed de Gaulle in the referendum of April 27, 1969, which
proposed regional reform and reorganization of the Senate.
Realizing the possible consequences of his action, the General
left a two-line message at the Elysee Palace for use in case
his initiative failed.

The message was simple and direct.

"I am ceasing to exercise my functions as president of the
republic.

This decision will take effect today at midnight."

He then returned to his home at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises to
awai the results of the referendum.

3^
It is ironic that a domestic issue was responsi
ble for de Gaulle’s resignation.

In a conversation with de

Gaulle after the referendum, Andri Malraux asked, "Why did
you leave on a question as secondary as that of the regions?"
"Because of the absurdity," replied de Gaulle.
One analyst has observed that "the May events
amounted to an unscheduled referendum on ten years of Gaullist
rule."^1

This statement helps explain the results of the ref

erendum held the following year.

The French electorate was

ready for a change, and the referendum provided them an oppor
tunity to vent their frustrations.
write his second set of memoirs.

The General settled in to
He did at home on Monday,

November 9» 1970.
Charles de Gaulle's View of the World
Charles de Gaulle’s world view was based fundamentally
on the notion of the supremacy of the nation-state over ideo
logy.

He believed that the nation-state (the nation being

the people and the state their institutions) would survive
any historical challenge by an ideology, particularly Marxism.
<2
De Gaulle thought Marx's "masses" did not
exist.He
believed that, in the final analysis,

the

people would obey

and support only the nation-state. ^

One

analyst has summarized

de Gaulle's philosophy as follows.
General de Gaulle's foreign policy is con
structed on a foundation of three major
ideas.
France must occupy a place in the
front rank of nations.
Relations between
states--whether allied or not--are based on
power and guile.
Ideologies are of rela
tively little importance, and the only real
forces confronting each other in the inter
national arena are individual nations.
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De Gaulle himself expressed it best in his classic statement:
"A state worthy of the name has no friends.'*-^
In de Gaulle's international order, there were four
groups (ensembles) of states.

The first group comprised those

states under the influence of the United States, especially
Canada and Great Britain. . The second included Western Europe,
in particular those states that constituted the Common Market.
Great Britain was excluded from this grouping because of its
special economic and military relationship with the United
States.

The third ensemble consisted of those nations aligned

with the Soviet Union, particularly Eastern Europe and Cuba.
The fourth group included all the so-called non-aligned devel
oping countries, especially China and the Third World.
In de Gaulle's view, the international system estab
lished at the Yalta Conference, to which de Gaulle was not
invited, was illegitimate and unstable.

In order to restore

the system to equilibrium, several events had to take place.
First, the United States must withdraw its conventional forces
from Europe, leaving its nuclear umbrella intact.

Then, France

could negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany by
playing on the Soviet desire to stabilize its western frontier
and strengthen its defenses along the Chinese border.

This

move would establish a "European entente from the Atlantic to
the Urals.

De Gaulle's scheme seems unrealistic at best,

even to an impartial observer.

Because de Gaulle considered

Russia tied by geography, history, and race to Europe, he
included it in his "Atlantic to the Urals" definition of Europe.
"Russia, for all its deviationalist ideology, authoritarian
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regime, and expansionist pretensions, remained European and
ultimately could be assimilated, de Gaulle felt, within his
world view."

His definition of Europe did not include

Britain, however.
The de Gaulle Style
A close examination of Charles de Gaulle's treatment
of problems in French foreign policy reveals few clearly dis
cernible patterns of behavior.
dictable.

The French leader was unpre

In order to appreciate Gaullist foreign polity, it

Is necessary to understand the man.
historian,

In the words of one French

"It seems somewhat arbitrary to determine what is

Gaullist and what is not in politics ... because de Gaulle
himself often changed his mind."

To attempt to define

Gaullist foreign policy is no easy task; Gaullism was quite
often whatever General de Gaulle decreed it to be.

Another

observer has summed up the de Gaulle style as follows.
Everything was thus made crystal clear:
de Gaulle alone would handle foreign
policy and it would be his policy.
He
did so cautiously until the referendum
in October 1962.
After that he grew
increasingly daring:
he throttled the
opposition.
Parliament no longer delib
erated on the major foreign policy
options.
It debated academically the
consequences of the chief of state's
unilateral decisions.
The Council of
Ministers was informed % posteriori■
Georges Pompidou acknowledged that only
three ministers had prior knowledge of
the decision to withdraw from NATO.
Going over the heads of the intermediary
bodies, de Gaulle announced his decisions
to the French people and presented his
comments to the press.59
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De Gaulle's style in dealing with allies was as
frustrating as it was effective.

He often employed the

politics of the empty chair at conferences and negotiations.
This gesture was intended to detract from the legitimacy of
the proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important
partner.

The advantage of this tactice was that de Gaulle

could indignantly announce to the world that neither he nor
his representatives had been consulted on an issue,: and that
therefore any agreements concluded were not binding on the
French people.

When not openly- boycotting an assembly,

French delegates often employed the tactic of frontal assault
against the most powerful ally present, usually the United
States.

This ploy of opposition for its own sake became known

as the politics of "no," which de Gaulle and his envoys practiced with great success among enemies and allies alike.

60

Jean Lacouture has noted that "until his challenge to NATO
in 1966, Gaullist diplomacy— that mixture of effervescent
swagger, icy realism, and generosity--was a tradition which
6l
no Frenchman could disown without being unduly cynical."
Survey research indicates that de Gaulle's attack
on NATO strengthened rather than weakened his position among
his followers.

62

The withdrawal from NATO is a classic exam

ple of the politics of "no" and the politics of the empty
chair.
The most obvious factor influencing de Gaulle's
presidential style was his military background.

He had com

manded the Fourth Armored Division during the Battle of France,
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leading counterattacks against the cities of Laon and
/T o

Abbeville. ^

He knew the true face of war, including re

treat, defeat and humiliation.

The measure of a man is not

how he handles success, but how he handles failure.

De

Gaulle learned early that effort is only rewarded when it
is crowned by success.

There is no doubt that his military

experiences exerted considerable influence over his presiden
tial style.

De Gaulle remained "the General" until his

dying day.
As The Edge of the Sword suggested, de Gaulle con
sidered the roles of statesman and soldier perfectly compat
ible:

each contributed to the overall welfare of the nation.

Each entailed a certain distance from the people; de Gaulle
was fully aware that this distance was necessary to preserve
his mystique.

The familiar image of the General striding down

the Champs-Elysee after the liberation of Paris in August 19^4
remained indelibly imprinted upon the memories of a generation
of Frenchmen.

The General was in a class by himself, and he

deliberatly cultivated the image of being different than the
average mortal.

This is one reason why he refused to parti

cipate in postwar partisan politics.

He believed that domestic

politics were beneath a man of his stature; to enter the poli
tical arena would deprive him of the main advantage he enjoyed
over other leaders--his mystique.

Rather than invite compari

son with other men, de Gaulle chose to depart from the poli
tical scene in 19^6.

By divorcing himself from the activities

of the Fourth Republic, he preserved his districtiveness and
became the only attractive political alternative in 1958.
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De Gaulle made a conscious effort to identify himself as a
military hero and a retired statesman rather than a politi
cian.

He groomed himself for public office on his own terms

and bided his time patiently.
It is no coincidence that a military crisis brought
de Gaulle to power.

The Algerian dilemma transcended partisan

politics; it required a solution that was acceptable to the
government, the army, and the people.

Algeria pitted a reb

ellious army against an ineffective government, and it was
soon apparent that the army had the upper hand.
met the needs of France in 1958 perfectly.

De Gaulle

He was a military

man who could deal with the generals in Africa, but he was
also a statesman with the best interests of France at heart.
His reputation as a soldier and statesman made him the obvious
choice for premier and for president.

De Gaulle rode on over

seas policy question rather than a domestic issue into office;
this would set the tone for his presidential style.
From the start, de Gaulle spurned domestic political
structures and politicians in carrying out his Algerian policy.
The constitution of the Fifth Republic established executive
primary in foreign affairs at the expense of the legislature.
De Gaulle's use of popular referenda to decide issues reflected
his plebiscitarian concept of government.

He viewed politicians

as the representatives of special interests who could not be
trusted to protect the national interest.

The people were

sovereign; only they could decide what was best for France.

^0
Before submitting issues to referendum, de Gaulle
tried to gauge the mood of the electorate.

Those issues

that he believed would pass were brought before the forum
of -popular opinion; more controversial issues were shelved
or solved behind the scenes.

During his honeymoon period

with the French electorate between 1958 and 1962, the voters
approved all four of the initiatives he proposed.
The resolution of the Algerian crisis in 1962
caused a shift in de Gaulle's support.
returned to metropolitan France.

The regular army

For the first time since

19^0, the French army was not fighting an overseas war.
French society assimilated returning residents of Algeria
with relative ease, especially along the Meditteranean coast.
The Gaullist Union for the New Republic made impressive gains
in the National Assembly.

The year 1962 marked the high tide

of de Gaulle's popularity.
At peace for the first time in twenty-two years,
Frenchmen seemed to become more introspective.
de Gaulle's image began to suffer.

After Algeria

His poor showing on the

first ballot of the presidential election of 1965» the Gaullist
losses in the legislative elections of 1967> the student riots
in 1968, and his final defeat in the referendum of 1969 all
serve to illustrate the gradual erosion of his base of support.
As France turned its political gaze inward, de Gaulle's for
tunes declined.

Though the army and parliament opposed him

initially, he managed to appease the former and neutralize
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the latter.

A majority of voters approved his policies in

the beginning, but the same majority repudiated him in 1969Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy may be summarized
briefly:
France.

he wanted a powerful, prestigious, independent
In trying to accomplish these objectives, he pur

sued policies that were opportunistic and unpredictable.
Bowing to the political exigencies of the times* and acknow
ledging colonialism as a relic of the p'ast, he freed Algeria.
One analyst has remarked that de Gaulle sacrificed Algeria on
the altar of French prestige and grandeur.

De Gaulle always

had the interests of France in mind; had he sought a military
solution to the Algerian problem, he would have weakened France
militarily, economically, and in terms of international pres
tige.

By granting Algerian independence, he avoided prolonging

the agony.
De Gaulle did not succeed in his goal of making
France a world power.

Even with its nuclear strike force,

France is at best a second-rate power in the modern world.
De Gaulle's detractors have argued that his -delusions of
grandeur caused him to squander billions of francs on nuclear
armaments, money that could have been better invested in
France's domestic economy.
The General did manage to avoid affiliation with
either superpower bloc.

He tried to maintain a strategic

balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

For

example, he opposed the American presence in Southeast Asia,
and protested when President Johnson sent the Marines into

k2

Santa Domingo in 196 5 .

He also opposed the Soviet threat to

Berlin in 19^8, and criticized the Soviets throughout the
Cuban missile cirsis in 1962.
De Gaulle’s love-hate relationship with the Western
allies clearly illustrates his unpredictable nature.

His

anti-Israeli policy was particularly unpopular in Washington.
France began to disengage itself from Israel after the 1967
Six-Day W a r . ^

On June 2, 1967 > two days after the outbreak

of the war, de Gaulle halted the sale of Mirage fighter-bombers
to the Israelis, though he continued to allow the shipment of
war material,

including helicopters and gunboats.

An Israeli

commando raid on Beirut airport on December 28, 1968, provoked
de Gaulle's wrath.

He announced a total embargo of Israel.
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De Gaulle's critics have argued that his compaign
to exclude Britain from the EEC may have been in retaliation
for the rough treatment he received in London between 19^0
and 1 9 ^ .

His intransigence toward Britain is often cited as

evidence of his inability to forget the inustices of the past.
Yet this same man effected a historic rapprochment with
Chancellor Conrad Adenauer of Germany in 1962-6 3 .

De Gaulle

was well received in Germany, where he charmed audiences with
speeches delivered in German.

He had learned the language well

during his three years as a prisoner during World War I.
Similarly, critics have traced de Gaulle's strained
relations with the United States to his non-too-cordial rela67
tionship with P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt during World War II.

This explanation is too simplistic to merit serious consid
eration.

Simply stated, the French president was unpredict

able .
Conclusions
(1) De Gaulle's experiences as an army officer molded his
world view.

A man of action, he disliked ponderous institu

tions like the National Assembly.

He avoided participation

in partisan politics, preferring "man of the hour" situations
(2) The Fifth Republic was born of a foreign crisis.

After

1962, domestic conditions contributed to de Gaulle's downfall
(3) The French people supported de Gaulle in four referenda
held between 1958 and 1962.

After Algeria, his base of sup

port withered.
(A) The General achieved his objectives of power, prestige,
and independence only partially.

The nuclear strike force

is a vestige of his desire for all three.
(5) General de Gaulle's style recalls a vivid image of the
man to this day.

But arrogance is not the stuff of which

alliances are made.

De Gaulle tended to alienate rather than

appease, to confront rather than cooperate.
critics will never forgive him.

For this his

There is no doubt that he

was a product of the past, perhaps even an anachronism, but
he was always a unique personality.

CHAPTER II
Pompidou
At first glance, Georges Pompidou does not seem
the type of man to become president of France.

For two

decades, he lived in the shadow of his mentor, Charles de
Gaulle, serving as the Generalfs inconspicuous aide-de-camp.
Pompidou dealt with matters that de Gaulle considered
"housekeeping11, such as financing the campaigns of the
struggling Gaullist parties.

In the legislative elections

of 1951» "the Rally of the French People (RFP) managed to win
21.20 percent of the popular vote on the first ballot, largely
through the efforts of Pompidou.

Again in November 1958*

the Union for the New Republic (UNR) won 20 percent of the
vote in the legislative elections.

The General, always

aloof from party politics, did not participate in either
campaign.

1
As president, de Gaulle concerned himself with

prestigious matters of state, while his second-in-command
kept his political house in order.

Pompidou was on a first-

name basis with more Gaullist deputies than the General
admitted to knowing, and he kept political in-fighting to
a minimum.

By scratching backs and smoothing ruffled

feathers, Pompidou helped steer the Gaullist majority along

AA
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the path desired hy its leader, and helped mold it into a
cohesive and effective governing body.

De Gaulle disdain

fully referred to the National Assembly as Mthe kitchen"
2
and to politics as "the soup."
Georges Pompidou kept the
lid on the boiling kettle.
A schrewd businessman and intimate of France's
distinguished Rothschild family, Pompidou was at ease in the
financial world.

During the General's postwar exile from

politics, Pompidou served as a director of the Rothschild
bank.

The business contracts he cultivated during this per

iod proved invaluable when de Gaulle asked him to return to
the Elysee Palace in 1958 as chief of staff.

Four years

later de Gaulle appointed Pompidou premier, a position that
he held until the General dismissed him in 1968.

Pompidou's

tenure at the Hotel Matignon signaled a new phase in the de
Gaulle era:

his status as de Gaulle's right-hand man was

official and sanctioned by law.

It became increasingly ap

parent that the General was grooming Pompidou as his successor.
After 1965 Pompidou campaigned for the presidency, first dis
creetly, then openly, and his election to office in 1969
proved a natural culmination of events.

Pompidou's success

story is an interesting one, considering that the man was by
temperament more an administrator than a politician.

One

author has called Pompidou's meteoric rise to power "the
Pompidou enigma," which he described as follows.
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Judging by appearances, Georges Pompidou
advanced in life as if on a cushion of
air. Doors opened before him. His career
was spectular.
He was admitted to 1 1Ecole
Normale Sunerieure without much effort on
his part.
He graduated first in his class
with the regrets of the examining board:
it was he who had worked the least.
As
a professor, he wanted to do something
else, to participate in the excitement
of the liberation.
A friend introduced
him to General de Gaulle’s staff.
Another
friend directed him to the Council of State.
He knew nothing about law. Two years later,
his colleagues, named him secretary general
of their organization.
De Gaulle asked
Pompidou to work closely with him:
soon
Pompidou was the grand old man of the RPF.
A chance acquaintance introduced him to
the Rothschilds.
He did not know a bill
from a promissory note, k Soon he was
director general at Rothschild.
It wasn’t
yet the thirteenth of May (1958). The
General wanted to appoint him director of
his cabinet, a sort of vice president of
the Council of Ministers.
He returned to
his bank.
De Gaulle raised the bid,
placing Pompidou at his side, at the
head of the government, though he was
neither an elected member, a deputy, nor
a minister.
Possessing the General’s
confidence, he may one day be president
of the republic.3
Historical Summary
Georges Pompidou was thirty-three years old, a
professor of literature working on a critical study of
Racine's Britannicus, when he joined de Gaulle's provisional
government in 19^^.

The General appointed the young profes

sor to his cabinet as head of school and university affairs,
a position demanding someone who could write well.

When de

Gaulle left the government on January 20, 19^6, Pompidou
found himself unemployed.
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The two men went their separate ways for two years.
De Gaulle retired to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, and Pompidou
joined the council of State.

When de Gaulle's supporters

formed the RPF in the spring of 19^7* they asked Pompidou
to join them.

He served as finance chairman of the RPF

until the party officially disbanded on March 5> 1952.
De Gaulle began writing his War Memoirs in 1952 and
completed the first volume in the spring of 195^•

He en

listed Pompidou's services as literary agent; the negotiations
resulted in a satisfactory and lucrative contract.
195^ Pompidou joined Baron Guy de Rothschild's bank.

Later iri
For

the next five years he mingled with France's social and
financial elite, gaining the respect and confidence of an
important sector of the economy, and securing an appointment
as director of the Rothschild bank.
The armed insurrection in Algiers on May 13» 1958,
heralded the return of Charles de Gaulle to the political
scene.

Again de Gaulle asked Pompidou to join his cabinet.

On June 1, 1958, the National Assembly voted de Gaulle back
into power as president of the Council of Ministers and the
General appointed Pompidou director of his cabinet.

De

Gaulle became president of the republic on December 21, 1958
after winning a majority of the electoral college.
Pompidou presided over the formation of the UNR
that year as the Gaullists gained 212 seats in the National
Assembly.

De Gaulle remarked later that "history will never

know the tremendous role played by Pompidou in the creation
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of the Fifth Republic."

4

The General rewarded Pompidou

for his loyalty by appointing Michel Debre as prime mini
ster.

On January 8, 1959, the first day of the newly-’

inaugurated Fifth Republic, Pompidou resigned from the
government to reclaim his position at Rothschild.
Georges Pompidou returned to public service on
April 14, 1962, replacing Michel Debre as premier of France.
His star was on the rise.

At the age of fifty-one, he

boasted impressive credentials in four different pursuits:
as an intellectual (university professor, 1936-1944); as an
administrator (de Gaulle*s chief of staff, 1948-52, 1958); as
a financier (director of the Rothschild bank, 1954-62); and
as a politician (premier of France, 1962-68).

Pompidou was

a man of many talents, a success by any definition.
His fortunes began to wan with de Gaulle's in
March 1963, when inflation and a series of labor strikes
racked France's economy.

His reputation suffered greatly

from his inability to offer immediate remedies to the social
and economic ills that plagued the country.

As was to happen

in May 1968, the premier received the brunt of the criticism
leveled at the government.
After de Gaulle's weak performance at the polls on
the first ballot of the 1965 presidential elections, Pompidou
pressed the General for the resignation of his minister of
finance, Valery Giscard d ’Estaing.
Pompidou's argument as follows.

One author has summarized

By prolonging the austerity plan unduly,
the minister of finance was largely respon
sible for the failure of December fifth.
If we keep him on at the Rue de Rivoli
(ministry of finance), we shall run the
risk, for the same reasons, of suffering
an even more serious setback in the 19&7
(legislative) elections. -5
De Gaulle liked Giscard.

He countered that the

young man was highly talented and that he seemed to have
France's best interests at heart, a rare compliment coming
from de Gaulle.

Pompidou prevailed, however, and finally

convinced the General that he must dismiss Giscard.

The

embittered minister of finance later charged that Pompidou's
unbridled presidential aspirations had resulted in Giscard's
dismissal, an accusation not to be discounted.

It is possible

that Pompidou felt threatened by what he perceived to be Gis
card 's rapidly expanding powers.

The two men became bitter

political enemies as a result of the 19&5 incident.

Michel

Debre, whome de Gaulle had dismissed from the Matignon in
1962, was resurrected from political oblivion in 1965 to
replacing Giscard as minister of finance.
Though silent at first, Giscard went into open
opposition after de Gaulle's "Long live free Quebec!" speech
in Montreal in 19&7-

His "Yes, but ... " attitude enraged

the General, as did the Independent Republicans' criticism
of de Gaulle's methods.

When asked to evaluate the General's

performance in Montreal, Pompidou remarked,
wouldn't know how to dramatize things.

"As for me, I

That's not my style."

The young Turks of French politics were beginning to distance
themselves from de Gaulle's style, Giscard in dramatic fashion,
Pompidou more subtly.
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In June 1968 de Gaulle decided to replace Pompidou
for his indecisiveness during the student demonstrations of
the previous month.

He appointed Couve de Murville premier.

After his dismissal Pompidou effected a reconciliation with
Giscard, who remarked wryly, "I know how it feels to he dis7

missed."'

During his presidential campaign in May and June
g
1969, Pompidou adopted the slogan "Continuity and Opening."
This motto characterized the Pompidou style well:

he could

continue in the General's footsteps with certain well-chosen
deviations from the path.
uity in his leadership.

At the outset he stressed contin
"It is enough for me to know that I

am profoundly Gaullist," he told the press.
guides me and determines my actions."

"That is what

9

The Gaullists were by no means united behind Pompidou,
mainly because a longstanding rivalry existed between him and
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, leader of the Gaullist majority.
Before the 1969 election Pompidou agreed to ask Chaban-Delmas
to be his prime minister in exchange for Gaullist support for
his c a n d i d a c y . O n June 1, .1969, Pompidou received the
highest percentage of the first ballot with 43-95 percent.
Two weeks

later he defeated challenger Alain Poher in the run

off election with 57*58 percent of

the vote."^

As promised,

he selected Chaban-Delmas as premier.
Pompidou enjoyed a comfortable majority (383 of 490
seats) in the National Assembly when he took office.
Gaullists

The

had won 46.39 percent of
the vote in the 1968 legi12
.
.
slative elections.
Pompidou's parliamentary majority
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included two hundred ninety Gaullist deputies, sixty Inde
pendent Republicans-(the party of Giscard d'Estaing), and
thirty-three centrists of the Progress and Modern Democracy
parties.

His opposition consisted primarily of Communists,

Socialists, and splinter parties of the center-left. 13
^
Pompidou rated consistently favorable responses
in public opinion polls, averaging between 53 an<l
percent
Ik
approval of his performance in office.
One analyst attri
butes this record to his strong public image.

"One of the

reasons for Pompidou's popularity ... was that he qualified
as an intellectual.

He was a graduate of a grande ecole,

Normale Sup^rieure, he had written an essay on Racine, and
13
he was the editor of an anthology of French poetry." ^

One

Indication of the French public's esteem for Pompidou was
the naming of the Center for Arts, one of France's largest
and most popular museums, for him.
Once in office Pompidou outlined a three-pronged
program of "Completion, Development, and Enlargement."
Pompidou "triptych,"
ties:

16

The

as it became known, had three priori

(l) Completion of a common agricultural policy would

eliminate Internal tariffs among the Six and would promote
the implementation of a common external tariff;

(2) develop

ment in depth was to include banking and monetary policy,
taxation, social security legislation, and a common vote in
foreign affairs (shades of the Fouchet Plan); and (3) enlarge
ment of the Common Market meant admitting new members, most
notably Great Britain.

17
1
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Pompidou's emphasis on expansion of ties with
Western Europe, particularly within the framework of the
EEC, stood in marked contrast to the policy of his predeces
sor.

"Europe was the crucible of the Pompidou government's

foreign policy.

Western Europe was to be the principal

vehicle for the realization of France's domestic and foreign
policy goals.

Pompidou abandoned the traditional Gaullist

shibboleths of independence and grandeur in favor of 'comple
tion, enlargement, and strengthening* of ties with Western
Europe.
Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway were admitted
to the EEC in January 1972.

19
Norway chose not to join. 7

On

April 23> 1972, Pompidou submitted the issue of Britain's
entry into the Common Market to popular referendum.

Only 53

percent of registered voters turned out, partly because the
Socialist opposition had advised its members to abstain.

The

Communists had urged a "no" vote on the grounds that the EEC
endangered French national interests.
68 percent were in favor.

Of those who voted,

Of all registered voters, 37 per

cent were in favor, 17 percent were opposed, and k6 percent
20
had abstained.
The Pompidou government considered the vote a suc
cess, if not an overwhelming mandate.

It is interesting to

note that Pompidou used the referendum in much the same man
ner as de Gaulle.

The plebiscite did not really decide the

issue, because the members of the Common Market had decided
early in April to admit Britain.

Pompidou staged the referen

dum as a display of public confidence in his government.
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Pompidou was host to the Paris Conference of the
Nine of October 19-20, 1972.

The newly enlarged Common Mar

ket now boasted 40 percent of the world's trade, 50 percent
of the world's merchant marine, a population of 250 million,
and one of the world's highest standards of living.

Two

members, Britain and France, possessed nuclear weapons.
Pompidou tried to promote the idea of political integration,
proposing that each nation send a minister of European affairs
to Brussels.

The conference adjourned without reaching an

agreement.^
Pompidou's overture toward Britain constituted a
complete reversal of de Gaulle's policy.

This is especially

puzzling considering the fact that continuity was one of the
campaign standards of the Pompidou government.

Professor

Roy C. Macridis does not consider the admission of Britain
to the EEC a break with the past, however.

He maintains that

de Gaulle was contemplating Such a move toward the end of his
22
term m office.
Whereas de Gaulle had always preferred politics on
a world scale, Pompidou proved himself willing to engage in
European summitry.

He was instrumental in organizing the

conference of December 19&9 ("the Hague) , October 1972 (Paris) ,
21
and December 1973 (Copenhagen). J

He was particularly active

in the Copenhagen meeting of December 14-15> 1973 > which was
held to discuss the oil shortages Europe was experiencing in
the wake of the Mideast war. 24

France's three main oil suppliers "between 1965
and 1972 were Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, all militant Arab
states.

France suffered a substantial trade deficit with

all three during that six-year period.

2 *5

In 1971 > Pompidou

ended France's special relationship with Algeria, giving
independent oil companies free rein to deal with whomever
they chose.

Saudi Arabia quickly replaced Algeria as

France's foremost supplier, while Algeria fell to number
seven.

No state now supplies more than 16 percent of France

oil needs, compared to the 31 percent Algeria provided in
1968.

French supplies now come from many different sources,

but no nation monopolizes the trade.

28

In spite of these

precautions, the Arab oil embargo of 197^+ hurt France.
27
inflation rate reached 1^ percent in 1973 and 197^•

The

Pompidou's definition of Europe differed greatly
from de Gaulle's.

The General's Europe stretched from the

Atlantic to the Urals and included Russia while excluding
Britain.

Pompidou's Europe, by contrast, extended from the

Thames to the Elbe and included Britain while excluding
Russia.

Pompidou'is Europe was Western, Christian, capital2o
ist and democratic.
Addressing his European allies at the

Pompidou Conference in Paris on March 16, 1972, the French
president cited a common "geography, lifestyle, a certain
conception of democracy, and an evident political and econo29
mic interest" 7 that bound them.

Pompidou's style at these

summit meetings also contrasted with de Gaulle's.

One obser

ver of the French scene has noted that "Pompidou was more
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disposed than this predecessor to treat France's partners as
equals than as subordinates, creating thereby a more favora30
ble climate for unity talks.
Another detour from the Gaullist style was Pompi
dou's cooperation with the United States.

Where de Gaulle

had been combative, Pompidou was less so.

He saw no inherent

value in the politics of "no."
President Pompidou, abhorring open conflict
to a fault and sensitive to French weakness,
preferred accommodating United States power
where possible and adjusting to it when nec
essary.
Better to work with United States
influence than against it, even at the cost
of a questionable international prestige in
earning its ire. This was a commodity of
doubtful economic and political marketability
at home when the dominant objectives of the
after 1968 were addressed to the prosperity
and welfare of Frenchmen, not the grandeur
and independence of the French nation.^!
As president, Pompidou concerned himself with what
de Gaulle contemptuously called "housekeeping".

This shift

in priorities was apparent in Pompidou's television address
after the referendum of April 1972.
say people with a short-run view.

"'What is Europe?'
'Take care of France,'

and of course, the government's task is to think first about
France and about Frenchmen, about their prosperity, about
their welfare, about the grandeur and independence of our
32
country."-^

In summary, Pompidou was as concerned with the

welfare of Frenchmen as he was with the grandeur of France.
There was a genuine outpouring of public grief when Pompidou
died on April 2, 197^
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The Pompidou Style
In a 1965 biography of Georges Pompidou, the premier
is quoted as having described himself in these modest terms:
"In all my life, I have only made three or four decisions
concerning myself-—that of my marriage, that of leaving the
university to work with General de Gaulle, that of leaving
administration and politics to enter private business ... the
3A
rest were imposed upon me."^
There is an element of truth
in this self-appraisal, especially as it describes Pompidou's
relationship with de Gaulle.

As premier, he carried out de

Gaulle's policy decisions to the best of his ability.
shone as an administrator.

He

He performed equally well as

president without the General's guidance and far from his
imposing presence.
Lacking de Gaulle's personal prestige,
authority, and historical credentials,
and endowed with a more reserved person
ality, President Pompidou viewed himself
as ruling more by persuasion and manipu
lation than by command.
He did not claim
any special priviledge or right to rule
other than those conferred by the French
electorate.
"As for legitimacy, I hold
my legitimacy from the free election of
the French people who have carried me
where I am and before whom I alone am
re sponsible."53
While de Gaulle concerned himself with France,
Pompidou occupied himself with the average Frenchman.

Pompi

dou was much more receptive to the point of view of others
than was the General.
a good negotiator.

He was accessible, open to persuasion,

De Gaulle had his head in the clouds;

Pompidou had his feet planted firmly on the ground.

The
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following statement from a Pompidou press conference illus
trates this point.
"I'm not a historic personage.
I represent
no personal equation.
I have my own style,
my own manner, my own methods--and there's
the difference.
But in all essential mat
ters I will not deviate an inch; all that
counts is the independence of France, her
role in Europe, and her position in the
world.
Little by little, day by day, I
will see to it that she gets her proper
share of things, without fanfare or drama.
But I will see to it."36
Pompidou's goal in the conduct of foreign policy
was continuity and substance and change in style.

According

to his biographer Philippe Alexandre, Pompidou defended the
General's attitudes and priorities and instinctively followed
his predecessor in matters of state.

Pompidou's style cannot

be totally divorced from the General's, though.

His pragmatic

approach to politics is strongly reminiscent of de Gaulle's,
as evidenced by the following pronouncement.
gusts me.

"Politics dis

I have acquired a taste for it, because that is

how one gets things done! 37
The de Gaulle-Pompidou relationship was one of
mutual convenience.

De Gaulle benefited as much from the

services of his efficient lieutenant as Pompidou did from
the General's patronage.

Pompidou's biographer describes

their relationship in the following terms.

"De Gaulle made

Pompidou master of requests, established him at the Matignon,
made him appear on television, and will put him in the Elys^e
tomorrow, if it pleases him."^^

This account gives Pompidou

little credit for .his many talents.

A more balanced, sober,
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and realistic description of their division of labor appears
later intthe work.
himself:

"The General reserved four domains to

Algeria, which remained fiery, explosive; the

constitution, foreign affairs, national defense.

As for

the rest, he placed his confidence in the man who was in his
shadow, under his c o n t r o l . P h i l i p p e Alexandre concurs in
this appraisal, adding the "Pompidou had no connection with
foreign affairs save insofar as they affected the nation's
economy."
Since most of Pompidou's publications were scholarly
critiques of literature,

it is difficult to discern his poli

tical world view in his writings.

Unlike de Gaulle, he did

not chronicle his role in world events.

It is therefore nec

essary to analyze his speeches, press conferences, and public
statements to understand the man.

Though he sometimes served

as a mouthpiece for de Gaulle, his speeches offer an insight
to his own political philosophy.
Pompidou delivered an excellent summary of his
world view in an address before the American Glub in Paris
on February 2^, 1964.

He depicted a n e w international world

order, whose salient characteristics were the disappearance
of a

bipolar world, the emergence of a third world, and

development of fissures within the Communist bloc.

the

Henoted

that France's role in this new order was a changing one.
The important thing is that there were two
masses and that there was in each a head,
an uncontested and solitary head.
Since
that time the world has moved on, and we
gradually saw the emergence of a third
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mass ... a third world, neutral or neutra
list, it is said, whose principal concern
is its own development, the effort to
embark on industrial civilization and
industrial prosperity.
For this, it
counts indiscriminately on the aid of
one or the other bloc, at least of the
one that wants to give this aid, and
it fundamentally claims the right not to
take sides. This is the first change.
A second change came about when, within
one of these groups, (I am referring to
the Communist group) divergencies, shades
of opinion began to appear ... We find
ourselves in the presence of a Communist
bloc which is at the very least cut in
two; not, of course, that we should over
estimate these divergencies and maintain
that these countries will clash directly
and violently, but henceforth they march
separately and their policy is independent.
And then, something has also happened
within the Western bloc which is very
different but nevertheless worthy of
note:
the countries of Europe ... have
little by little regained their strength.
And so the old division into somewhat
monolithic groups is outmoded.
This extemporaneous commentary demonstrates Pompidou's appre
ciation of the importance of the emerging non-aligned Third
World, long before this term began to figure prominently in
the vocabulary of western political analysts.
As might be expected, the philosophy of de Gaulle
directly influenced Pompidou's interpretation of his country’s
role in this changing world order.

The General considered the

worldwide revolt against the bipolar system, which he called
the "two hegemonies," to be the major phenomenon of our time.
Pompidou stressed the independent role of France which, like
the Third World, should pursue a policy of non-alignment.

60
France, member of the European Community
and of the Atlantic Alliance, for this
reason does not intend to perpetuate the
policy of blocs ... We hope that relations
between East and West might one day be nor
malized and founded, in spite of the dif
ferences between regimes, on respect for
the rights of all and for the independence
of everyone.
Situated as she is geogra
phically and supported by her historical
traditions, France will be able to assume
her own role in the necessary re-establish
ment of good relations at least on the day
when the totalitarian world sincerely
renounces any inclination to commit
aggression.^3
Ever the pragmatist, Pompidou considered the pos
sibility of such a day only rhetorically.

He was well aware

of the role that the American nuclear umbrella played in the
defense of Western Europe.

He placed more credence in the

deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal than did de
Gaulle.

In his defense of the General's 1966 decision to

withdraw from NATO, Pompidou argued that the organization
itself could not prevent war and that only the American
nuclear threat could deter the Soviet aggression.
If there were to be a third great war in
Europe, it would be nuclear and Europe
would be destroyed ... but the nuclear wea
pon is not made to win war? it is made to
prevent it. The aggressor's certainty
that he would sustain unacceptable losses
is the only guarantee that we can have
against aggression ... That is what leads
us to remain in the Atlantic Alliance.
You think in terms of war, and of yester
day's war. We think in terms of deterrence,
that is to say, of peace.
Deterrence alone
can guarantee peace, and for the West the
only deterrence is nuclear.
You tell us:
NATO has guaranteed peace in Europe for
fifteen years. What an error, if you
are referring to the integrated organiza
tion!
What has guaranteed peace is the
alliance, insofar as it has brought to
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to bear the threat of the. American Strategic
Air Command ... It is atomic power, particu
larly American, also British and French,
that is preserving it. You believe solely
in integration, and that an alliance without
integration is of no use, while only the
nuclear weapons that are not integrated
really count.
You believe that the war can
be won, while we can only hope to avert it
by atomic deterrence.^
Disregarding the conventional military value of the NATO
alliance and emphasizing the value of the American nuclear
umbrella, Pompidou demonstrated a sound theoretical grasp
of the concept of deterrence.
In his statements Georges Pompidou proved himself
a well-informed, articulate, and persuasive speaker.

He

exhibited a knowledge of current events and'theoretical
concepts that often eluded his colleagues.

His sharp mind

absorbed ideas, assimilated them, and organized them into
rational, coherent, convincing arguments.

Pompidou worked

at a faster pace than most men, easily sustaining a workload
that quickly drained others.

His intellect and capacity for

work made him a habitual achiever and a formidable opponent.
Georges Pompidou was one of the rare individuals
who succeeded at almost everything he tried.

It was relative

ly easy to trace the experiences that combined to equip him so
well for office.

His early academic training contributed

greatly to his success.

Thoroughly schooled In the rigors

of Cartesian logic and literary criticism, he applied this
training in his defense of Gaullist policies before the
National Assembly.

His mastery of detail and of general

theory was impressive.
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His experience as an administrator, both under de
Gaulle and with the Council of State led him to understand
the machinations of the French political system.

The image

of the cool, methodical, plodding Pompidou emerged during
the period 19^+ to 1952.

He cultivated a variety of valuable

contacts and polished his interpersonal skills.
Pompidou's experience in the world of business
proved equally- valuable.

He distinguished himself in the

financial world as a director of one of France's most presti
gious banks.

The reputation he established in the private

sector brought benefits in the form of contributions to de
Gaulle's political campaigns during the early days of the
Fifth Republic.
As a politician he drew upon all his previous train
ing.

His political future, nurtured and sanctioned by de

Gaulle, seemed assured.

Yet Pompidou's relationship with

de Gaulle proved both his greatest asset and greatest liability.
Of all conditions affecting his career, his association with
de Gaulle had the greatest impact.

Though a Gaullist in sub

stance, he was not a Gaullist in style.
red "man of the hour" situations:
1958, are classic examples.

The General prefer

June 18, 19^0, and May 13>

He also loved dramatic exits:

witness January 20, 19^+6, and April 27» 1969*

Pompidou pre

ferred continuity in his career to periods of self-imposed
exile.

While de Gaulle waited in the wings, Pompidou applied

himself to new challenges.
a historic personage.

By his own admission, he was not

De Gaulle preferred drama and high
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visibility; Pompidou preferred calm and a low profile.

De

Gaulle negotiated publicly, often in the press; Pompidou
excelled at behind-the-scenes bargaining.

In matters of

style, the two men were the antithesis of one another.

In

the Hegelian tradition, the thesis and antithesis of de Gaulle
and Pompidou often merged to form a rational synthesis.
Whereas de Gaulle openly sought his niche in
history, Pompidou was not always master of his own fate.
He did not actively seek public office until he became pre
mier at the age of 51*

Both men emerged as national figures:

de Gaulle be design, Pompidou more by circumstance.
There were two main differences between the foreign
policies of de Gaulle and Pompidou.

Pompidou subordinated

foreign policy to domestic concerns, while emphasizing the
importance of the Atlantic alliance and his Western European
allies. ^

There were also several substantive changes under

Pompidou, which included (1) moderated criticism of the
United States,

(2) enlarged ties with Europe and Britain,

(3) emphasis of regionalism rather than globalism,

(4) more

multilateral diplomacy, using the talent and resources of the
Quai d'Orsay,
ing tool,

(5) limited use of the empty chair as a bargain

(6) renewal of coalition politics in domestic and

foreign policy, and (7) the notion that actions speak louder
than words.

A6

The three objectives of Pompidou's foreign policy
derived almost entirely from de Gaulle's:

independence of the

two hegemonies, enhancement of international prestige, and
the extension and enlargement of French power.

The Pompidou

6A
style affected two areas primarily..

A warning of relations

with London resulted in Britain's admission to the Common
Market in 1972 and renewed ties with Washington led to a
stronger French participation in NATO.

Pompidou's acknowledg

ment that the American nuclear umbrella was the cement of the
NATO alliance differed from de Gaulle's stance.

It showed a

pragmatism and solidarity with allies that was uncharacteristic
of his predecessor.
Conclusions
(1) Pompidou's experience in four areas (academic,
administrative, financial, and political) molded his world
view.

An intellectual at heart, he combined his talents with

great success.

He did not possess de Gaulle's flair for the

dramatic, nor did he consider himself a historic personage.
His political style was more methodical and discrete than
flamboyant.
(2) Pompidou's relationship with de Gaulle influen
ced his presidential style, which was often the antithesis of'
the General's.
(3) Support for Pompidou varied during his twenve
years in office.

His special relationship with de Gaulle

ended in the summer of 1968.

His relations with parliament

changed from a vote of no-confidence in 1962 to a predominantly
Gaullist legislature after his election in 1969*
(A) Pompidou continued the General's pursuit of
independence, prestige, and power in foreign policy.
(5) Pompidou strengthened relations with the western
allies, especially the United States and Great Britain.

His

flexibility vis 'k vis such issues as France's role in NATO
and Britain's admission to the EEC improved France's image
in Washington and London.

Because of his low profile,

however, Pompidou remains an enigmatic personality to the
foreign observer.

CHAPTER III
Giscard d'Estaing
It has been said that de Gaulle was a man of des
tiny, obsessed with the independence and grandeur of France.
Pompidou was pragmatic, a manipulator and negotiator.

It is

difficult to characterize Valery Giscard d'Estaing in such
terms, for he brings a different set of qualifications to
office than either of his predecessors.
One commentator has described Giscard as France's
philosopher-president, and with good reason.'*'

In 1977 Giscard

published French Democracy, an interesting treatise on French
modernization and its effect on his country and countrymen.
Giscard argues his points in a crisp, clear style that vividly
illustrates his intellectual capacities.

In his book*fche

French president proposes a four-point plan that includes a
higher minimum wage, a more progressive system of taxation,
decentralization of government, and a loosening of price
2
controls.
These programs are designed to help alleviate
some of the inequities of modern French society.
Ar article that appeared in the weekly newsmagazine
1'Express during the presidential campaign of 197^ was entitled
"Giscard Technocrat" and called him "the young man for whom
3
everything has gone so well."^ A graduate of France's
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prestigious National School of Administration, Giscard rose
rapidly through the ranks of the inspectorate of finance.
Appointed minister of finance in 1962, Giscard was consid
ered one of France's most promising young technocrats.

One

analyst has described France's young crop of technical ex
perts as follows.
A great number of ministerial posts were
given to technicians.
These men never held
an electoral office but came from the admin
istrative services that recruited from the
elite schools of France--notably the Ecole
Natlonale d 'Administration, established in
19^6 ... They were above all technicians
and managers, concerned with doing things,
providing for services, establishing plans
for economic development, running the public
social and economic services.
They were the
"technocrats"--with an eye to efficiency and
pragmatic choices, to statistics and econo
mic charts.
They were servants of the state
rather than elected representatives of the
people.^
A poll conducted in April 197^+ 1 one month before
Giscard was elected to office, confirmed this public image.
Respondents were asked to rank perceived strengths and weak
nesses in the candidate's character.

The public considered

Giscard's technical competence as his greatest asset, fol
lowed by his ability to handle responsibility, his unquestioned
integrity, his communications skills, and last of all, his
Catholicism.

The public perception of Giscard*s weaknesses

is perhaps more revealing.

He was thought by many to be

better acquainted with facts and figures than with human reali
ties; some considered him a grand bourgeois; finally, he was
perceived as a solitary man.-*
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A comparison of the relative strengths and weak
nesses of Giscard and his challenger Francois Mitterrand
gave Giscard a definite advantage.

Frenchmen were asked

which of the following traits applied to each candidate.
(See table on page 69)
It is difficult to categorize Giscard the philosopherintelleetual-technocrat.

Philippe Alexandre offers the fol

lowing irreverent and entertaining description of France's
current present.
France, too, has h e r -eggheads. Giscard d'Estaing,
a disciple of Kennedy and Galbraith, is one of
them.
Reared in the expectation that he would
one day become president of the republic, in
1962 at the age of 3 6 , he was appointed minister
of finance.
He appeared to be on'his way. But
less than four years later he was dismissed
from the past by Pompidou. D'Estaing struck
back by criticizing the General, uttering his
famous "Yes, but ..." After de Gaulle departed
in 1969 he entertained the hope of becoming
president, but his aspirations proved short
lived.
Realizing he was still too young, he
finally decided to support Pompidou.
The new
president rewarded Giscard by reinstalling
him as minister of finance.
Slender, elegant,
and prematurely bald like so many brilliant in
tellectuals, he likes to ski and hunt wild game
in Africa.
His wife and daughts are all named
after flowers.?
Giscard's World View
Few political leaders commit their philosophies to
print while they are still in office.

De Gaulle specialized

in ex post facto analysis, preferring to chronicle his role
in world events in the form of memoirs.

Pompidou's publica

tions consisted mainly of scholarly literary analyses.

By

contrast, Giscard published French Democracy after only three
years in office.

He sets forth his world view in this short
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TABLE 2
GISCARD YS. MITTERRAND IN A PUBLIC OPINION POLL

Characteristic

3card

Man of experience
Man o f auth or ity
Dynamic
Very cultivated
Honest
Sincere
Inspires Confidence

85%
73%
79%
8.6%
72%
65%
.65%

Source:

Mitterrand
71%
65%
71%
66%
51%
49%
kZ%

1 *Express 1189» 22-28 April 197** • P- 19-
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but often eloquent work.

In the opening pages he summarizes

the effects of modernization of France, noting that France
has changed more since 195° than it did in the 80 years
before mid-century.

He cites the following statistics

for the period 1950-1975*

France's national product more

than tripled in volume, and real consumption per capita
nearly tripled; the infant mortality rate was reduced by 25
percent; a man's life expectancy increased by six years and
a women's by eight; the amount spent on food declined by
half, that spent on hygiene and health increased threefold;
six times as many young people obtained their baccalaur
eates; the minimum old age pension increased threefold in
real terms; and eight and a half million houses of apartments
were built.

He notes that in 1950, no one had a washing

machine or television set; by 1975 seven out of ten had a
o

television.

He fails to mention that in 1950, few people

in the world owned a television set.

Finally, he points out

that in order to earn what they need to buy the same goods,
Frenchmen have to work only half as long as they did twenty
years ago.

9

The economist's penchant for figures and statis

tical trends is apparent in this description.

Giscard*s nar

ration gives evidence of his technical background, of his
insistence on precision and accuracy.

In a later digression

Giscard informs his readers that "the social sciences in France
are insufficiently developed, and opinion about the facts is
constantly preferred to knowledge of the facts themselves."^
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In his discussion of French modernization Giscard
compares the strength of the French economy to that of its
neighbors, Great Britain and West Germany.

He takes great

pride in his nation's performance, maintaining that France
is the world's third largest exporter, on a par with Japan,
and that it has a gross national product 56 percent higher
than B r i t a i n ' s . ^

Projecting these figures into the future,

Giscard predicts that by 1985» France's industrial production
12
should be comparable to West Germany's.
Though Giscard is no Gaullist, he echoes many of
the General's favorite themes in foreign policy, including
competition with Britain, an utter contempt for Marxist
ideology, and the reaffirmation of France's independence.
It is noteworthy that Giscard''s competition with Britain is
economic, whereas de Gaulle's was political.

Giscard’s

attack oh Marxism is in much the same vein as his criticism
of the social sciences in France; the technocrat in him rebels
at the inconsistencies inherent in Marxist doctrine.

"Marxism

mystifies when it claims scientific status while ignoring the
disciplines of science; when it attributes all oppression to
economic power; when it reduces the history of nations to the
class war; when It confers
and redemptive role." IB

upon one particular class a messianic
• •
Finally,
Giscard is as uncompromising

as de Gaulle about French independence, which he defines as
"the right to decide for ourselves, in the last resort, everything we consider essential for the French nation."
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Independence is not the essential ingredient of
Giscard's foreign policy.

He also stresses cooperation,

a term quite foreign to de Gaulle's vocabulary.
policy,11 he writes,

"Foreign

"will be based on the will to remain

independent and the practice of solidarity and cooperation."

1<

Here Giscard signals a departure from Gaullist doctrine in
style as well as substance.
he continues,

"To assert its independence,"

"France does not need to be cantankerous.

And

when it practices cooperation France does not risk being
diminished, for it has a vocation to cooperate."

16

Giscard specifies three goals that France will pur
sue in its relations with European allies.

His policy of

cooperation and solidarity translates into the following
concrete actions:

the healing of relations with Germany,

begun by de Gaulle and Adenauer; solidification of ties within the E E C ; and the formation of a European Parliament.17'

As

a former minister of finance, Giscard feels strongly about
the economic unification of Europe.
French democracy has clear ideas about the
union of Europe.
We shall not try to impose
a detailed plan on others, but we intend to
prevent Europe from dissolving into confused
or impotent structures.
First of all,
economic and monetary union must be completed,
according to the terms of the Treaty of Roem.
It has to be admitted that this much-needed
union is still a long way off.
Our number
one task is to make it a reality.
Next we
must make progress with the confederal machi
nery of the European union,
In a final rather general summary Giscard outlines
his view of France's international role.

Like Pompidou be

fore him he admits that the world is still dominated by
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competition between the superpowers and conflict among the
nations belonging to the main alliances.

He stresses that

France will continue to pursue a policy of detente in its
relations with the superpowers.

He singles out the indep

endent states of Africa as an area of special interest to
France, indicating that Fr^ce will continue to give them
financial support as well as other types of aid.

In a

departure from Gaullist doctrine, he notes that France will
cooperate ratherthan confront in relations with its allies.
In conclusion he acknowledges the interdependence of the
nations of the world, stating that the solution to economic
problems and security issues cannot be found at a national
or regional level, but only at a world l e v e l . ^
Historical Summary
Val'ery Giscard d'Estaing was born in 1926 of a
distinguished family of civil servants who for centuries
20
have combined careers m finance with public service.
He enlisted in the French army in 1 9 ^ and saw his first
action at the age of eighteen against SS units in the
Danube region.

After the war he enrolled in the National

School of Administration and graduated at the top of his
class.

In 1952 he joined the inspectorate of finance and

served in a variety of capacities during the next ten years.
After de Gaulle appointed Giscard minister of fin
ance in 1962 the young man embarked upon a deflationary pro
gram of austerity to cool down France's economy.

Giscard's

outspoken manner did little to endear him to the aging Gen
eral, however.

When de Gaulle dismissed Giscard from his
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government in 19 6 5 » he formed his own party, the Independent
Republicans-

Shortly after Pompidou's victory in the presi

dential campaign of 1969 he re-appointed Giscard minister of
finance.

When Pompidou died in April 1974, the forty-eight-

year-old Giscard skirmished with established members of the
Gaullist coalition for leadership of the right.

His opponents

included Edgar Faure and Pierre Messmer, both relies of the
Gaullist old guard, and Jacques Chaban-Delmas.

Giscard and

Chaban-Delmas represented the right on the first ballot of
the presidential election held May 5> 1974.
Francois Mitterrand, the Socialist leader and candi
date of the left won 43*24 percent of the votes on the first
ballot.

Giscard followed with 32.60 percent of votes cast,
21
and Chaban-Delmas brought up the rear with 15*10 percent.

During the critical two-week period before the run-off
election Mitterrand and Giscard courted uncommitted members
of the pivotal center-left parties, particularly the Unified
Socialists and Radicals.

Mitterrand was counting heavily

on the dissolution of the center vote and its defection to
the left.
Though Mitterrand gained support from the center,
he did not gain enough to win.

Giscard suffered losses from

the same quarter but not enough to lose.

22

In the left's

best performance since de Gaulle came to power, Mitterrand
23
received 11,882,926 votes or 49.20 percent of votes cast.
Giscard received 50*80 percent of votes on the second ballot,
defeating his challenger by a margin of less than A00,000
2U
v otes.
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A composite analysis of the electorate showed that
Giscard's supporters were predominantly older, female, and
25
rural; Mitterrand's were younger, male, and urban. ^
Giscard*s support was also conservative and in many cases
non-Gaullist, as a poll of his political constituency revealed.
A survey conducted by Nouvelles Litteraires indicated that
53 percent of Giscard's voters held a positive view of Marshal
P^tain, leader of the collaborationist Vichy r e g i m e . ^
Addressing the French public immediately after the
election, Giscard announced,

"I understood during this cam

paign that you wanted change, social and political change.
You won't be disappointed.
I will bring about change, with
27
your help."
Once in office, Giscard sponsored legislation
to lower the voting age to eighteen, to legalize abortion,
and to liberalize France's strict divorce statutes.

His gov

ernment increased the minimum wage and retirement benefits,
offered asylum to political exiles, suppressed wiretapping,
and curtailed arms sales to undemocratic regimes.
In 1978 Giscard*s cabinet consisted of thirty-six
posts, the largest ever in the Fifth Republic.

Only fifteen

were ministers-with-portfolio, however. The other twenty-one
were secretary-of-state positions for such diverse areas as
foreign labor, university affairs, penitentiaries, and adult
education.

There were three women in the cabinet, two of

whom were ministers.

Six cabinet members were graduates of

the National School of Administration, three were from the
Institute of Political Studies, and four were former civil

servants.

Giscard has drawn heavily from among his fellow

technocrats.

Though some cabinet members were in their early

forties, most were in their fifties like Giscard.

A majority

of Giscard's ministers were centrists; only one-third were
Gaullists.^
In the finest tradition of de Gaulle, Giscard has
made unilateral policy decisions without consulting his cabi
net.

In 197^ he anounced his intention to conduct underground

nuclear tests.

When Giscard ignored Jean-Jacques Servan-

Schrieber's criticism of his decision, the leader of France's
Radical party resigned from the cabinet m

protest.

29
^

Frangois

Giroud, secretary-of-state for women's affairs, left the gov
ernment in disgust after Giscard repeatedly discounted her
recommendations.

The former editor of 1 1Express has written

an account of her experiences entitled The Comedy of Government
Giscard's party does not enjoy a majority in the
National Assembly.

In 1975 his governing coalition included

185 Gaullists and 110 centrists, mostly Independent Republi30
cans.
The Communist-Socialist alliance of the left mounted
one of the greatest challenges to Giscard's rule during the
legislative elections of March 1978.

The two parties agreed

on a platform known as the "Common Program" inl972 and public
opinion polls conducted before the 1978 elections favored the
alliance to win. 31

The legislative elections of 1978 were

as hotly contested as the presidential contest four years
earlier.

There was a record 85 percent turnout for the run

off election.

The Union for French Democracy, organized by
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Giscard's supporters in the closing.days of the campaign, won
137 seats and emerged as the second largest party (behind the
Gaullists)

in the National Assembly.

The Gaullists lost sup-

port, returning 1^8 of an original 170 deputies to parliament. 32
In all, the Gaullists and the Union for French Democracy cap
tured 285 of parliament's ^90 seats, a clear majority.
The election was not the overwhelming victory for
the left that the pollsters had predicted.

Voters who sup

ported the left on the first ballot defected to the right on
the second.

Raymond Aron, who describes the French intel

ligentsia as "the most intelligent and the most unreasonable
in the world" notes that many vote their convictions on the
first ballot and their pocketbooks on the second. 33
^

Practi

cal considerations outstrip ideological ones in the end.

The

election did prove that the united left is a political force
to take into account.

De Gaulle had always maintained that

there were two poles in the French political spectrum:
Gaullists and the Communists.

the

Andre Malraux went so far as

3A
to say that "between the Communists and us there is nothing."^

After the 1978 election Giscard's advisors admitted that one
of de Gaulle's greatest errors had been to accentuate this
polarization.

The dominance of the extreme right and the

extreme left in French politics has become a thing of the
past.

Giscard seems to prefer it that way.

He has stated

that his dream is to end the polarization of French

politics.

The 1978 election proved that there are four main parties in
the French political spectrum rather than two.

The Independent
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Republicans won almost as many seats in the National Assembly
as the Gaullists, and the Socialists commanded more vote than
3<
the Communists for the first time since World War I I . ^
As a politician Giscard has shown considerable
talent for deflecting the criticism his opponents direct to
ward his government.

He has insulated himself from direct

scrutiny by letting his prime minister act as a political
lightning rod.

When his first premier, the Gaullist Jacques

Chirac, resigned in August 1976 Giscard named Raymond Barre
as his successor.

Giscard introduced Barre to the French

public as "France*s best economist," citing his credentials
as a professor of economics at the Sorbonne.

The president

promised voters that Barre would remedy inflation and im
prove the economic situation in time for the 1978 elections.
This political move protected Giscard from the criticism of
Chirac's Gaullists and the left, prompting political pundits
to call Barre "Giscard's life-jacket" and "presidential
battleship.
Barre is well acquainted with the politics of con
frontation.

Two decades ago he represented France before the

Common Market Commission, where his criticisms of American
monetary and trade policies won high mark from de Gaulle.
He also served as minister of foreign trade in Chirac's cabi
net.

Responding to an American warning against Communist

participation in Western European governments in 1978, Barre
replied in typical Gaullist fashion, "France does not have to
take advice or lessons from anyone.'-

37
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Barre has enjoyed a certain degree of success at
his appointed task.

His anti-inflationary measures reduced

France's inflation rate "by three percentage points in time
for the 1978 election.

He has also helped cement relations

"between Paris and Washington. ^

Giscard's tactic of letting

Barre act as "lightning rod" for general discontent cost him
some popularity in the polls.

A survey conducted "by the con

servative newspaper Le Figaro showed that the favorable rating
of Giscard's performance in office slipped from 62 percent
in January 1979 to 5A percent in July to a mere ^9 percent in
September.

Barre's likewise fell from 36 percent in July 1979

to 29 percent in September.

When compared to Jimmy Carter's

rating of 19 percent approval in September 1979» Giscard's low
of 49 percent does not seem so abysmal.

Also, compared to the

fortunes of the Gaullists, who were seriously contemplating a
change in leadership in September 1979» Giscard was riding
high.
Giscard's timely appointment of Premier Raymond
Barre helped salvage the domestic and international situatio
for the president.

Above all, his narrow margins- of victory

in 197^ and 1978 indicate that he is a survivor.
Gis card's Foreign Policy
Giscard is a political realist, as evidenced by
his criticism of President's Carter's human right policies,
but he does not advocate a return to Cold War relations
between East and West.

His main objection to Carter's

human rights stand was that it had compromised the process
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of detente.
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In a July 1977 interview he descrihed detente

as the only reasonable alternative to an escalating arms race
between Moscow and Washington.
I don't believe that detente is a ruse
to lull the West into a false sense of
security while they achieve global mili
tary supremacy and later world domination.
In my judgment, Moscow's detente objec
tives are limited and specific.
Firstly,
a slowdown and then a reduction in the
nuclear arms race on the basis of parity.
Mr. Brezhnev is wondering whether one
of the U.S. objectives isn’t to recap
ture a measure of military technological
superiority.
Secondly, the recognition
that there are very real and specific
areas for developing economic, political,
and cultural cooperation outside the
ideological competition.
Detente is an alternative to a senseless
arms race.
Detente is an option on the
opposite course that is designed to avoid
confrontation and maintain rough parity
in armaments, while attempting to col
laborate, without forsaking our respective
convictions that one side's system is
superior to the other.^0
Giscard aired these opinions shortly after Brezh
nev's state visit to Paris in June 1977» which focused
upon the issue of d e t e n t e . ^

The French government re

considered its position after the Soviet invasion of Afghani
stan in December 1979*

Though the French initially took a

milk view of the invasion, they later modified their stance.
Eleven days after the news became public, Giscard signed a
joint statement with German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt con
demning the Soviet move, then proceeded to soften his state
ment in the course of background briefings for domestic con
sumption.

He seemed reluctant to condemn the Soviet action

or to endorse it. A2

Giscard refused to support an American initiative
to impose sanctions against the Soviets during the spring of
1980.

When France opposed a meeting of European leaders in

Bonn, the United States scuttled the plan.

Instead, Secre

tary of State Cyrus Vance made a fast-paced visit to several
European capitals.

Cherishing its special relationship with

Moscow, France had once again distanced itself from an American position. J

French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poneet

remarked early in the crisis that "France is not America's
barnyard."

AA

Giscard issued an angry statement criticizing

American efforts to coordinate allied sanctions against the
Soviets that signalled to Moscow his reluctance to line up
behind Washington.

In a later press conference, he commented

I'm surprised at the Insistence of certain
people to push us--unsuccessfully, by the
way--toward alignment with the ideas of
this one or that one, that is to say, the
reconstitution of the system of blocs
that increase tension on one hand and on
the other eliminate the margin for maneu
ver and influence of France's foreign
policy ... Any meeting that would result
in a bloc approach to the current situation
will not win French participation.
An American mission dispatched to enlist the sup
port of European leaders was rebuffed in Paris, primarily
because it had arrived uninvited.

The Americans had the

effrontery to visit Paris with their initiative in hand,
rather than submitting it in advance through channels for
French endorsement.

Because France had not been consulted

beforehand (shades of de Gaulle), it would not be party to
any sanctions agreement.

Giscard sought to balance France

between East and West by refusing to take sides in the disput

Asked what de Gaulle would have done in such a
crisis, Maurice Couve de Murville, the General's foreign
minister of many years replied, "A country that is a member
of an alliance cannot say that it is non-aligned.
contradiction in terms.

It is a

France should follow its own policy.

It should not offer its good offices between the superpowers."
Giscard admitted that his policy was too complicated for the
American public to understand.
ked to a reporter,

A member of his staff remar

"To the average American, it undoubtedly

looks contradictory to say that we are your allies and we
have our own independent foreign policy."

A7'

Like any successful politician, Giscard is an oppor
tunist.

His willingness to exploit a temporary advantage has

resulted in strengthening of ties with the Common Market,
NATO, and France's former colonial possessions in Africa.
Giscard's vision of an expanded Common Market with more Medi
terranean members has not always been popular with his country
men.

He has expressed a commitment to membership for Greece

and Spain, partly to support the democratic governments that
have replaced military regimes there.
guese membership is less vocal.

His support for Portu

Almost all the French parties

led by the Gaullists, have opposed the Spanish and Greek appli
cations.

They fear that these countries will flood the French
A8
market with surplus wine and produce, undercutting prices.
This feeling is particularly strong in the Midi region, where
French farmers annually converge on the provincial capital
of Montpellier to protest the influx of inexpensive foreign
wines into the local market.
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Giscard has shelved his plans for expanding the
EEC in the face of domestic opposition.

He remains committed

to the principle of strengthening Europe through such organi
zations as the European Parliament and the Common Market,
however.
Despite all the doom and gloom, another
important point has been the agreement
on European elections for a European
Assembly by universal suffrage.
Over
100 million Europeans will go to the
polls on the same day in nine countries
to cast their ballots in a gesture of
continental dimension.
Cassandras not
withstanding, this decision was taken
by France and Britain at the same time.
Those who say this does not strengthen
the European Executive (of the Common
Market) cannot see the forest for the
trees.
In a world of crisis and turmoil,
Europe is still moving forward.
I get
very irritated by these constant plaintive
whimpers on the sad fate of Europe.^9
Recent events suggest that France may be consider
ing rejoining the NATO a l l i a n c e . T h e

thirteen-member

defense grouping would certainly benefit from such a move,
which would increase NATO strength in Europe by half a mil
lion troops, more than 1,000 tanks, and some $00 aircraft.
The European argument in favor of France's return
to the fold is persuasive.

Deployment of French ground for

ces would relieve the 5°0>0°0-man West German army of its
singular responsibility for the defense of the corridor sep
arating Europe from the Warsaw Pact.

The only countries with

any sizable troop presence in the forward positions are
Britain (55>000) and the United States (225>000).

Since the

United States abolished the military draft in 197^+, reserves

8^
are so depleted that it is unlikely the United States could
muster any immediate ground support in case of a Soviet con
ventional assault on West Germany..

Soviet military planners

are currently uncertain how France would react if West Germany
were attacked, hut a firm commitment from France would settle
the issue and strengthen the alliance.

In summary, French

power is needed to fill the void created by waning American
influence and general apathy among smaller members of the
alliance.

Such a commitment would also improve NATO's over

all effectiveness and morale as a European combat unit.
The French argument against the move is equally
compelling.

What has France to gain from such an arrangement?

If American influence in the region is indeed evaporating,
this only serves to justify de Gaulle's decision of fifteen
years ago.

The General was correct in questioning the Ameri

can commitment to the defense of Western Europe.

Besides,

how could France's independent nuclear strike force be inte
grated into the NATO command structure?

Furthermore, French

troops would never agree to follow the command of Americans,
who still dominate the upper echelons of the organization.
As the world's third most powerful nation militarily, France
has everything to lose and nothing to gain by rejoining NATO,
Finally, and most important, the French argue, it is not NATO
but the American nuclear deterrent that prevents Soviet aggres
sion.

Premier Pompidou articulated this conviction on April

21, 1966, when he defended de Gaulle's decision to withdraw
from NATO before the National Assembly.
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You tell us:
NATO has guaranteed peace
in Europe for fifteen years.
What an
error, if you are referring to the inte
grated organization!
What has guaranteed
peace is the alliance, insofar as it has
brought to bear the threat of the American
Strategic Air Command ... It is atomic
power, primarily American, also British
and French, that is preserving it.-51
Professor Roy C. Macridis has described France's
. .
■
.
^2
military strategy as "how to have the alliance and the bomb."^
French military planners, according to his theory, envision
the NATO alliance as a first line of defense
sion from the East,

againstaggres

while the nuclear strike forceserves

a weapon of last resort.

as

In a typical scenario, NATO and

French forces would defend Western Europe in conventional
battle.

If It became apparent that the aggressor intended to

invade and occupy France, the French government would alert
the enemy that it was willing to retaliate with nuclear wea
pons.

This critical threshold of aggressiveness is the key

to the situation.

Having issued a warning, the French govern

ment would then consider itself free to employ the nuclear
strike force independently on NATO, regardless of whether
NATO ground forces were still engaged in battle.
Obviously, this scenario contradicts the spirit and
intention of the NATO alliance.

The nuclear strike force

isolates France from its allies, since it cannot be integrated
into the NATO command structure.

According to Macridis, the

basic problem is France's intransigence in the face of any
form of integration--be it political or military.
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Though avoiding military integration with his
NATO allies, Giscard has agreed to define the circumstances
under which the nuclear strike force would be employed
against an aggressor.

This is reassuring to the NATO allies,

v/ho were stunned in November 1968 when de Gaulle's chief of
staff, General Ailleret, announced France's all-horizons
defense p l a n , ^

This plan anticipated enemies on all sides,

and stated France's intention to oppose the aggressor from
54
whatever quarter he came.
In short, France's nuclear strike
force was poised to strike in all directions. ^

Under Pompidou,

the army was reorganized in a manner that emphasized the pri
macy of the nuclear weapon--with improved delivery capabili
ties and the development of some four nuclear submarines with
m i s s i l e s . P o m p i d o u decreased overall defense spending,
however:

in 1970, for the first time in the Fifth Republic,

expenditure for education and research exceeded that for
<7

national defense.^'

Under Giscard, a spirit of cooperation

and consultation with the NATO alliance appears to have
replaced the Gaullist tradition of confrontation with allies.
Giscard is resigned to the reality of Europe's dependence on
the United States for its ultimate defense.
France's activites in Africa indicate an increased
awareness of its role as a member of the western alliance.
In April 1977 Giscard convinced King Hassan II of Morocco
to dispatch 1,500 troops to the aid of Zairian President
Mobutu's embattled army in the mineral-rich Shaba province.
France provided transports and technical advisers for the
airlift.

The Moroccans helped turn the tide against the
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Katangan invaders, who were reportedly supported by Cuban
advisors from Angola.

King Hassan II afterward maintained

that
Charles de Gaulle never would have abandoned
Africa's French-speaking countries.
This
policy (military support for former French
colonies) was shelved under Pompidou but is
now being revived under Giscard.
High time,
too.
Nothing succeeds like s u c c e s s . 59
Hassan appears to have a selective memory.

Pompidou in fact

re-opened official relations with Morocco on December 15»
1 9 6 9 , after de Gaulle had severed them.
II said "I did not acede to de Gaulle.
60
do so before Pompidou."

At that time Hassan
I have no reason to

Giscard won the applause of both Zaire and the U.S.
Department of State for his African venture.

In May 1978

the Katangan rebels launched a similar invasion, this time
aimed at the copper-mining town of Kolwezi.

Giscard respon

ded by airlifting 600 paratroopers of France's crack Foreign
Legion in conjunction with Belgian forces.

The Legionnaires

did most of the fighting in and around Kolwezi, precipitating
a massive withdrawal by the invaders.

Giscard evacuated the

Legionnaires shortly after their successful mission.

Again

he won the approbation of the United States and the Western
allies, with the exception of the Belgians, former colonial
masters of the region.

Concerning his decision to intervene

in Zaire, Giscard commented:

"I came to the conclusion that

the U.S. and Europe were absent in Africa at a very crucial
moment and that it was necessary to act on our own to pre
serve the security and territorial integrity of a western-
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oriented state— which, hy definition, means the protection
of western interest."

6l

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sent Giscard what
Soviet sources described as a sharp message after the Kol
wezi operation.

Giscard replied with public criticisms of

Soviet violations of human rights.

The tension eased only

after the foreign ministry's African affairs director, Guy
Gregory, visited Moscow to explain the French action.

Accord

ing to one source, he pointed out that France was in Africa
to defend its interests there and that the French had no
intention of becoming America's Cubans in Africa.
Having proved that they can be useful in performing
missions that the Americans are in no position to undertake,
the French have become serious foreign policy partners of
the United States in Africa.

One commentator has noted that

"unlike de Gaulle, who always seemed to leave American offi
cials wondering if his cooperation, when it did occur, was
not a prelude to finding a new way to tweak Uncle Sam's
beard, Giscard has gone out of his way to act as a loyal
partner.

When he opposes the United States, he always seems

to convey the message that he is being a loyal opponent, and
opposes Washington only on a specific issue.
De Gaulle established a reputation as a protector
of moderate African governments by intervening militarily in
black Africa three times in his eleven years in power.

In

the year between May 1977 and May 1978* Giscard committed
French forces on five fronts in Africa and the Middle East.

6^
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Giscard's extension of French power to the continent of
Africa is a rather unique aspect of French foreign policy
in the Fifth Republic.
Giscard began improving his ability to operate in
Africa shortly after he assumed office in 1974.

With General

Guy Mery, army chief of staff, he fashioned an elite corps
of 20,000 lightly-armed troops that could be airlifted to
Africa on eight hours' notice to fight brush-fire wars and
engage in counterinsurgency operations.
his quick-reaction forces almost at will.

Giscard can deploy
In the finest

tradition of de Gaulle, he ordered the paratroop jump on
Kolwezi after only perfunctorily consulting his cabinet
and ignoring parliament.^
France's interests in Africa justify Giscard's
activities there.

Among the most ardent advocates of the

French presence are Morocco's King Hassan II, Senegal's
President Leopold Senghor and the Ivory Coast's President
Felix Houphouet-Boigny.

There are 55>000 French citizens

in Morocco, 40,000 in the Ivory Coast, and 24,000 in Senegal,
with all the economic interests their presence implies.
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The French also have lucrative economic ties to Muammar
Kaddafi's Libya.
Libya.

There are 2,400 Frenchmen working in

During the 1970's France sold 164 Mirage jets,

twelve warships, and uncounted helicopters to the Kaddafi
regime.

The Peugeot-Citroen automobile firm has contracted

to sell 30,000 cars in Libya this year.

Several French firms

have negotiated defense contracts there as well.
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In May

1978 the Ivory Coast's Felix Houphouet-Boigny reiterated
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his country's dependence on France:
port of France.

"We count on the sup

We have complexes about that ... There is

no reason that France, faithful to its traditions, should
not honor its commitments toward us, that is to say, to
68
come to our aid if we should be attacked."
Giscard has
said that he favors Africans themselves being responsible
for security in Africa:

"We should have an Africa Corps

made up of Africans," he remarked.
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Giscard has practical reasons for the growing
French military presence in Africa.

The troops there help

protect France's interest in raw materials, including copper
in Zaire and uranium in Chad.

He has reaped political bene

fits from his show of power in Africa:

his popularity in

creased dramatically after the airlift of Moroccan troops
to Zaire in April 1977 •

Giscard's African policy also fills

a void left by the United States when the American Congress
voted to end military aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola in
December 1976.

Although French officials admit to nothing,

it is widely assumed that France is supplying arms and am
munition to the UNITA guerrillas of southern Angola, who
continue to battle the ruling MPLA faction and the Cubans
there.
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In June 1978 French Foreign Minister Louis de

Guiringaud described the French effort to fill the void as
follows:

"It is probable that the weakening or the disappear

ance of a certain kind of American presence in the world today
encouraged the Soviets to profit in these various situations
of tension.

What we are trying to do above all is help the

Africans themselves take control of their problems." 71
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Giscard described the process as pre-empting a vacuum:

"In

Africa, I think it is more a matter of targets of opportunity
than a grand plan.

When a vacuum is created, as was the case

in Angola, the Soviets fill it.
in Ethiopia.

The same thing has happened

But when the vacuum was pre-empted by others,
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they did not persist.” 1
The 10,000 French troops stationed in Africa in
1978 constituted a foreign force second only to Cuba's ^0,000.
They were spread across the continent in small units.

(See

table on page 9 2 . ) ^
In addition to its African contingency, France main
tained 1,200 U.N. peace-keeping troops in Lebanon.

In Febru

ary 1980 the French had the largest permanent naval presence
in the Indian Ocean of all the western allies, with four
heavily armed frigates and a command ship based at Djibouti,
plus eight transport vessels, destroyers, and patrol ships
7k
operating from La Reunion Island.
These forces together
comprised the largest French military presence abroad since
the end of the Algerian war in 1962..^
In December 1977 Senegal's President Leopold Senghor
provided France its most important base in black Africa.
Giscard established a tactical wing of ten Jaguar jets at
a base near Dakar.

In May 1978 fighting broke out between

Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara, which both
sides claimed.

France's ten Jaguar jets flew air strikes to

protect underpopulated Mauritania against incursions by the
Algerian-backed and Soviet-armed Polisario guerrillas fighting
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TABLE 3
FRENCH TROOPS IN AFRICA UNDER GISCARD (1978)
Country

C ommitment

Chad

1,^00 troops

Djibouti

A,50° troops

Gabon

550 troops and advisers

Ivory Coast

550 troops and advisers

Mauritania

100 troops

Senegal
Zaire
Total
Source:

1,200 troops
700 troops
9,000 troops and advisers
Newsweek, 5 June 1978, pp. 59 and 6l.

93
for control of the Spanish Sahara.

The Jaguars killed

dozens of guerrillas in an attack on a convoy in Mauritania
early in May, and continued to fly reconnaissance and harasrp /T

sment missions throughout the campaign.
Other French missions in 1978 included protecting
Chad's government from Libyan-backed guerrillas.

French

forces particpated as U.N. peace-keepers in the former French
mandate of Lebanon that year and three French soldiery died
in the fighting.

Some ^,000 French troops were still sta

tioned in Djibouti a year after it was granted independence
in July 1977.

One of France's three aircraft carriers con

tinues to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa to protect
French oil routes there.

77
'

France withdrew 1,500 troops from Ghad in 1980,
reducing its total commitment in Africa to approximately
8,000.

These forces are roughly divided among Djibouti

(^,000), the: Central African Republic (1,270), Senegal
(1 ,000), Gabon (800), and the Ivory Coast (800) . ^
Another aspect of Giscard's foreign policy that
bears a striking similarity.to his strengthening of ties
with the EEC, NATO, and French Africa is his special rela
tionship with Germany.

Giscard and German Chancellor Helmut

Schmidt enjoy a personal friendship that is reminiscent of
de Gaulle's reconciliation with Konrad Adenauer two decades
ago.

The Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 established

semi-annual meetings between the two heads of state.

Over the

past decade Schmidt and Giscard both former finance ministers,

9A
have met dozens of other times.
their relationship as relaxed.

Officials in Bonn describe
A French aid noted that the

two men have great esteem for one another and that they have
confidence in each other's intellect.

Giscard*s relaxed

style has been an asset in his dealings with Schmidt, who
is often moody and impatient.

Giscard has kept his advice

to the chancellor private, knowing Schmidt does not appreciate
being lectured in public.

The two speak frequently by phone,

usually in English, though they understand each other's lang
uage.

Schmidt once told an assembled delegation that he and

Giscard spend a lot of time discussing history, comparing
their peoples* common problems, and drawing conclusions from
t h e m .79
Their special relationship has translated into
concrete policies, particularly in the realm of European
integration.

Aside from the proposed monetary union, the

two leaders have collaborated on such issues as direct elec
tion of a European Parliament and expansion of the Common
Market to include Spain, Greece, and Portugal.

"Giscard has

a much clearer concept of the vital elements of our relation
ship," said a German official.

"His policy is to avoid unneces

sary friction and not to confront the U.S.

That has eliminated

a major problem for u s . " ^
Despite the French emphasis on the Third World,
Giscard has made a special effort to cultivate good relations
with the Germans.

Keeping Paris and Bonn together during the

opening phase of the Afghanistan crisis proved especially
difficult.

Giscard is aware that together Germany and France

95
are the world’s third power--economically, militarily, and
politically.
Giscard does not discount the threat that the War
saw Pact poses to France and Germany.

In a May 25» 1978

address before the U.N. General Assembly’s special session
on disarmament he stressed the need to find a way to reduce
the Warsaw P a c t ’s superiority over NATO in conventional
weapons.

For example, he noted that the Warsaw Pact has

three times as many tanks as NATO.

He called for a new Euro

pean security conference that would seek to negotiate a
balanced reduction in the enormous arsenals of conventional
weapons possessed by the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.
In the course of his address he unveiled several ambitious
arms control proposals.

The French president suggested the

creation of a new international agency that would monitor
arms agreements through the use of satellites, and called
for the establishment of a world institute for disarmament
...
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studies.
Giscard is willing to recognize France's status as
a medium power in the modern world.
view," according to one observer,

"The Elysee takes the

"that all of de Gaulle's

pretensions to great-power status are finished, but that we
need to show that we are a medium power that has the means
oq
and the willingness to make itself respected."
Speaking at
a special press conference on foreign affairs in February 1979»
Giscard suggested the creation of a medium-power triangle.
He proposed a summit conference of Western Europe, African,
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and Arab leaders, clearly excluding the United States, the
8A
Soviet Union, and China.
One analyst suggests that Giscard's foreign policy
is dedicated to ending France's isolation from NATO, the Medi
terranean, and the United States.

In particular Giscard is

wholly committed, as he states in French Democracy, to the
notion of European union and the establishment of a functional
parliament in Strasbourg.

Giscard has abandoned several key

elements of Gaullist foreign policy.

He is less inclined

than his predecessors to balance France between the United
States and the Soviet Union, or to alternately undermine the
policies of Washington and Moscow.

He is more concerned with

the creation of a united Europe than with the formation of
an independent Europe under the leadership of France.

Finally,

he appears to view the nuclear strike force as a credible
nuclear deterrent within the confines of the Atlantic alliance
rather than independent of it.

Nostalgia for the past has

given way to exploring the opportunities of the present.
Cooperation has replaced confrontation as the watchword of
French foreign p o l i c y . ^
Conclusions
(l) Giscard's experiences as a technocrat and civil servant
molded his world view.
intellectual.

Like Pompidou before him he is an

Unlike his predecessors, he governs by coali

tion rather than by majority.

His often slim margin of

victory demonstrates his political shrewdness and ability to
survive.
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(2) The death of Pompidou catapulted Giscard into the natio
nal consciousness.

He is an opportunist who has exploited

other situations (particularly in Africa) to the fullest.’
(3) Support for Giscard within the French electorate is
predominantly conservative, rural, and female.

He has suc

cessfully deflected challenges from both the alliance to
the left and the Gaullists, contributing to the formation of
a new centrist force in French politics.
(^) Giscard has abandoned the politics of grandeur in an
effort to establish France as a medium power.

He still

jealously guards France's independence in foreign policy,
especially in the matter of its nuclear strike force.
(5) Giscard's style is distinctly European.

He has tried to

promote regional integration through French participation
in the EEC, NATO, and the European Parliament.

He has

strengthened ties with the United States and Britain.

His

low-key, relaxed style has placed France on cordial terms
with its allies for the first time since de Gaulle came to
power in 1958.

Westerners are comfortable with Giscard's

emphasis on cooperation instead of confrontation.

Americans

see in the French president a kindred spirit rather than a
scheming antagonist.

CHAPTER IV
Conclusion
Chapter One established five general criteria and
three specific issues by which to compare the leaders of the
Fifth Republic.

The following tables seek to characterize

each president in the eight individual categories.
(1) Experiences

De Gaulle was the soldier-statesman;
Pompidou was the administratorintellectual ; '
Giscard is the technocratphilosopher.

(2) Conditions

De Gaulle's presidency was born
of the Algerian crisis;
Pompidou's presidency grew from
his close relationship with
de Gaulle;
Giscard's presidency resulted
from Pompidou's death.

(3) Support

De Gaulle was originally supported
by the people in a series of plebi
scites and later by a Gaullist maj
ority in the National Assembly;
Pompidou was originally supported
by de Gaulle and later by a Gaul
list majority in the National
Assembly;
Giscard was originally supported
by conservative, rural, and female
voters and later by a Centrist
coalition in the National Assembly
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(3) Opposition

De Gaulle was originally opposed
by the National Assembly, which
he dissolved after a vote of noconfidence in 1962, and later
resigned after receiving a nega
tive vote in the plebiscite of
1969;
Pompidou received a vote of noconfidence as Premier in 1962
and was later dismissed by de
Gaulle in 1968;
Giscard was dismissed by de Gaulle
in 1965* was opposed by leftist,
urban, and male voters in 197^»
and was challenged by the Commu
nists, Socialists, and Gaullists
in 1978.

(4) Goals

De Gaulle was obsessed with power,
prestige, and independence;
Pompidou continued to pursue the
General's objectives of power,
prestige, and independence;
Giscard prefers medium power, res
pect and independence.

(5) Style

De Gaulle was a confrontational,
unpredictable egotist;
Pompidou was a pragmatic, metho
dical, negotiator;
Giscard is a cooperative, oppor
tunistic survivor.

(6) EEC

De Gaulle sought to limit the
Common Market to the Six and ex
clude Great Britain from member
ship ;
Pompidou preferred to expand the
Common Market to nine members
and admit Britain;
Giscard seeks to further expand
the Common Market to twelve mem
bers, including Spain, Greece,
and Portugal.

(7) NATO

De Gaulle withdrew France from
NATO in 1966 and stressed the
development of his independent
nuclear strike force;
Pompidou maintained France's dis
tance from NATO and at the same
time de-emphasized the importance
of the nuclear strike force;
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Giscard has steered France back
toward the alliance and has de
fined the terms under which he
would consider using the nuclear
strike force.
(8) East-West Relations

: De Gaulle balanced France between
the superpowers, favoring neither,
and supported French Africa;
Pompidou engaged in summitry,
emphasizing the nonaligned Third
World, and supported French
Africa;
Giscard opposed the policy of
blocs, favoring the establishment
of a medium power triangle, and
has intervened actively in French
Africa.

A poll conducted in France in 1967 asked the follow
ing question:

"Which features of French foreign policy, if

any, are likely to persist after de Gaulle?'"

Thirty-four per

cent of respondents foresaw a continuation of uncooperative
French policies toward the United States and NATO.

Twenty-

seven percent predicted a continuation of the Franco-German
rapprochement.

Fifteen percent anticipated a continuation of

de Gaulle's policies in the Mideast.

Only twelve percent

expected a continuation of the General's policies toward the
non-Western countries, particularly Southeast Asia and China.
In short, the respondents expected that the Gaullist style
of somewhat prickly and self-assertive diplomacy might be
modified in relatively marginal matters, but would persist
in substance.'*'
Events have not borne out this expectation.

French

foreign policy since de Gaulle has changed in both style and
substance.

Pompidou's foreign policy differed from de Gaulle's

in several basic respects,, not the least of which was the
emphasis placed on nuclear weapons.

Pompidou tended to
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discount the role of the nuclear strike force in the interna
tional arena, while de Gaulle paraded it before the world.
A second major difference was that while de Gaulle's world
view was global, Pompidou's was regional.
quite often exceeded his grasp,

2

De Gaulle's reach

but Pompidou's vision rarely

extended beyond Europe, the Meditteranean, and North Africa.
He considered it more important for France to be able to
respond rapidly to challenges within its immediate sphere
of influence than to involve itself in protracted wars of
attrition as in Indochina and Algeria.^
One major area of similarity between de Gaulle and
Pompidou was their opposition to the SALT negotiations and
to arms limitation treaties in general.

Both men felt that

SALT was an affront to the independence of France, a treaty
carefully calculated by the superpowers to exclude the rest
of the world.

De Gaulle and Pompidou regularly practiced

the politics of the empty chair at nuclear disarmament conLl
ferences.
The French often refused to attend disarmament
conferences on the grounds that they were intended to rein
force nuclear monopoly among those states that already pos
sessed nuclear weapons.

They boycotted talks on mutual

balanced force reductions between the United States and the
Soviet Union on the grounds that any accommodation reached
between the superpowers would weaken the defense of Western
Europe.

They refused to participate in the SALT talks for

the same reason.
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Under Pompidou France's arms sales abroad soared.
In 1970 France replaced Britain as the world's third largest
arms exporter, behind the United States and the Soviet Union.
The success of the Mirage fighter-bomber during the 19&7
Arab-Israeli war sparked particular interest in French armaments among buyers in the Mideast.

6

Pompidou focused his political gas inward, toward
France and Frenchmen; de Gaulle looked outward, toward the
world and affairs of state.

One analyst has noted that "as

much by default as by desire, the Pompidou government focused
on strengthening its domestic political base and on encourag
ing closer economic and political cooperation with its Euro
pean partners rather than on promoting rapid changes on
7
defense questions at home and abroad."
Giscard has also differed from de Gaulle on key
issues, particularly France's participation in the EEC and
the NATO alliance.

Although Giscard publicly follows official

Gaullist doctrine that France will never rejoin the military
part of the Atlantic alliance, French cooperation behind the
g
scenes in NATO is very broad nowadays.
Giscard is no Gaullist.

He came to power with the

image of a friend of the United States rather than a Gaulliststyle adversary.

This change in style is Giscard's most sal-

lent contrast with his predecessors. 9
Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Val6ry
Giscard d'Estaing have all left their personal mark on French
foreign policy during the past 23 years.

Each president had

a unique style that determined the flavor of his country's
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activities aborad, and that reflected in the conduct of
France's foreign affairs.

As long as de Gaulle's Fifth

Republic endures, its presidents will continue to mold
France's foreign policies to their own personalities.

It

is this aspect of French foreign policy that makes it such
an intriguing topic to the student of international relations.
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